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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY
GENETIC SCREENING STATUTES
Recent advances made in the geneticsfield enable the medicalprofession, through
genetic screening devices, to prediet for parents whether their child will carry or be
afflicted with geneticproblemrs. Accompanying this medical breakthrough are impor-
tw-t legal questions concerning the consttutional proprieqy of legislatively mandated
genetic screeningprograms. In this Note, the author ident/iesfourpotential consti-
tutional challenges to mandatory genetic screening laws, analyzing thepossible argu-
ments under each approacl The author concludes with proposals for improving
existing screening statutes and suggests guidelines within whichfuture screening stat-
utes should be able to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
INTRODUCTION
ABIOMEDICAL revolution is occurring in the field of genetics.
Knowledge has been accumulating rapidly in the genetic field
since the late 1960's when scientists first were able to decipher the
genetic code.' More recent developments in the understanding of
genetic defects include detection of both carriers of genetic defects
and those individuals afflicted with genetic disease by genetic
screening2 and a growing legal acceptance of birth prevention.3
These medical and legal advances relating to human reproduction
"have given parents new options aimed at avoiding the tragedy of
bearing genetically defective children."4 Medical science increas-
ingly is prepared, through the process of genetic screening, to pre-
dict for parents whether their child will carry or be afflicted with
1. See Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical
Issues, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 696 (1973).
2. Throughout this Note, a distinction will be made between carriers of a genetic
disease and those individuals suffering from the disease. This distinction is made because
most of the genetic diseases discussed in this Note are autosomal recessive. This character-
istic means that the carrier of the defective gene does not manifest the disease and cannot
pass the disease onto his or her offspring unless the other parent is also a carrier or has the
disease. When two carriers reproduce a child, that child has a 25% chance of being geno-
typically normal (does not inherit the defective gene at all), a 25% chance of being afflicted
with the disease (inherits the defective gene from both parents), and a 50% chance of being
a carrier (inherits the defective gene from either the mother or father). Genetic diseases
which occur when a child inherits the gene from either parent are labeled autosomal domi-
nant. In these cases, a carrier of the genetic disease also manifests the disease. See Annas
& Coyne, 'itness"for Arith and Reproduction" Legal Implications of Genetic Screening, 9
FAm. L.Q. 463, 464-69 (1975).
3. See Shaw, Genetically Defective Children: Emerging Legal Considerations, 3 AM.
J.L. & MED. 333, 333-34 (1977).
4. Id. at 333.
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genetic problems.'
As with most medical advances, the procedures for genetic
screening raise a plethora of questions concerning legal, ethical,
social, political, and moral matters.6 This Note will discuss the
legal problems accompanying genetic screening laws. Initially,
the Note will survey the significant advances made in understand-
ing genetic disease and its causes.7 This survey will examine the
various types of genetic screening devices and the potential
problems associated with each device. The Note then will review
the historical development of genetic screening laws.8 Included in
this discussion will be the Maryland model state statute and the
Federal Genetic Diseases Act.
The Note then will focus on the four major constitutional chal-
lenges to a mandatory genetic screening program:9 1) the fourth
amendment challenge that mandatory screening procedures, such
as blood tests and amniocentesis, constitute an unreasonable
search;' 0 2) the fourteenth amendment challenge based on the
right of privacy in making marriage and procreation decisions I or
based on the right of privacy regarding the confidentiality of data
collected through screening;' 2 3) the fourteenth amendment equal
protection challenge that only persons testing positive would re-
ceive counseling and, therefore, be treated differently than those
persons testing negative; ' 3 and 4) the first amendment attack
based on the notion that since the acceptance or refusal of medical
treatment hinges on religious tenets, mandatory genetic screening
and its procedures abridge the constitutional guarantee of free-
5. Genetic screening most often involves a blood test or testing of the amniotic fluid.
The blood and/or fluid can be tested to ascertain whether its donor is suffering from a
genetic disease or is merely a carrier. See notes 36, 45, & 50 infra and accompanying text.
Methods of genetic screening include prenatal screening, screening of newborns, screen-
ing of children when they reach school age, and screening of adults in their childbearing
years.
6. Some of these questions are: Whether people want to know if they carry a defec-
tive gene; whether those individuals with defective genes will be willing to limit their
choice of a mate or forego having children when they discover they carry a defective gene;
whether parents should choose abortion or bring a defective child into the world once they
are notified that the fetus is afflicted with a genetic disease; and who defines normal.
7. See notes 16-61 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 83-168 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 169-370 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 175-225 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 241-74 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 275-83 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 284-330 infra and accompanying text.
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dom in exercising religious beliefs. 4
The Note will conclude by outlining proposals for improving
genetic screening legislation.'5 Some of these proposals include:
careful definition of the groups covered by screening legislation to
avoid an equal protection challenge; funding for continuing re-
search; periodic evaluation of screening procedures and follow-up
medical surveillance of those persons tested; adequate disclosure
to those individuals screened of the capabilities of genetic screen-
ing and full explanation of the results; and provision for strict con-
fidentiality of data collected through screening.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
GENETIC SCREENING
Every individual carries between two and eight lethal genes.
The average number of defective genes possessed by each per-
son-the genetic load-presently is increasing. 6 Advancements
in medical science which prolong the average life span, and
thereby expand the overall number of childbearing years, are
causing this increase.17 Additionally, medical advances keep car-
riers and those persons actually afflicted with genetic disease alive,
enabling them to reproduce and pass on genetic defects to subse-
quent generations. Genetic weaknesses and deformities increase
as the life span and the number of childbearing years expand.18
The increase in the genetic load previously was offset by death
and natural selection, but today those individuals with genetic in-
14. See notes 331-70 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 371-97 infra and accompanying text.
16. Estimates of defective genes vary since not all defective genes are detectable, but
the average genetic load is between two and eight. L. CAVALLI-SFORZA & W. BODMER,
THE GENETics OF HUMAN POPULATIONS 364 (1971). Presently, there are more than 2,000
catalogued traits that are positively or tentatively shown to be determined by a single gene,
and, on the average, 100 additional traits are added each year. Foreword to V. McKusIcK,
MENDELIAN INHERITANCE IN MAN at vii (5th ed. 1975). See notes 23-25 infra and accom-
panying text.
17. "Our biological mastery of life has certain unwelcome side effects when we fail to
guard against them." J. FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENErIc CONTROL 27 (1974). The
average American's life span in 1900 was 47; in 1930, 54; in 1967, 70.5. For Christian
Scientists, a religious group whose members refuse medical treatment, the average life span
in 1967 was 69.5. These figures indicate that preventive health systems are adding years to
the life span. Ingle, Genetic Basis of Inhi'vidualiy and of Social Problems, 6 ZYGON 183
(1971).
18. The number of children afflicted with Down's syndrome (monogolism), for exam-
ple, has tripled due to improvements in neonatal surgery and support systems. See Shaw,
Doctor, Do We Have a Choice?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 44.
1981)
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firmities are "preserved and protected" through medical science.' 9
Gene mutation also contributes to the genetic load. A gene
mutation is a spontaneous change in a gene which is usually dan-
gerous. 20 Once a gene has been transformed, the change is repro-
duced whenever the gene is passed on to the next generation.2'
Radiation (X-ray) and chemical influences are known causes of
mutant genes. 2 As the mutation rate increases, the genetic load
also increases.23 The combination, therefore, of a longer life span
through medical science and mutations cooperate to increase the
genetic load. With an average of four to five generations per cen-
tury, the present genetic load should double within two centu-
ries.24 This increased load could lead to an increased demand for
medical services, placing a drain on human and monetary re-
sources." The increasing genetic load, the numerous people af-
fected by genetic disease,26 and the monetary and emotional costs
involved in treating such disease27 explain the interest in eliminat-
19. See J. FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 29.
20. A gene mutation is a physical change in a gene which causes the gene to specify an
altered gene product or fail to function. See Annas & Coyne, supra note 2, at 465.
21. Carlson, When Man Seeks to Control Herediy, The Province Sunday Journal,
June 5, 1977, § N, at 44, col. 2.
22. Crow, Mechanisms and Trends in Human Evolution, 90 DAEDALUS 416,430 (1961).
23. Id.
[Tihe more often a mutant arises and the less the selection against it, the higher
will be its frequency in the populations. To reduce the genetic load one would
have to lower the mutation rates and/or increase the elimination rates. What is
actually happening in human populations is exactly the reverse-mutation rates
tend to increase and selection rates tend to decrease.
T. DOBZHANSKY, HEREDITY AND THE NATURE OF MAN 291 (1964).
24. See J. FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 29.
25. Id.
26. "An untold amount of suffering is due to diseases predominantly genetic in ori-
gin-at least 20-25% of chronic disease being of this type." Robinson, Genetics and Soci-
ety, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 487. An estimated 12 million Americans suffer from genetically
caused diseases and disabilities. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF GENERAL MEDICAL SCIENCES,
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, WHAT ARE THE FACTS ABOUT GENETIC DISEASE? 6
(HEW Pub. No. (NIH) 75-370, 1975).
27. The cost involved in caring for children afflicted with Down's syndrome (I in
every 600 births) is $1.7 billion per year. A child suffering from Tay-Sachs disease, with a
life expectancy of 3-5 years, costs his or her family $20,000-$40,000 per year to receive
adequate medical treatment. H.R. REP. No. 498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 709, 727.
The emotional injuries to the family and society are similar to those harms connected
with communicable disease. Joseph Fletcher, a theologian and moral philosopher with
strong opinions on the subject, has stated:
[IIt is always unjust and therefore unethical or... immoral, to knowingly and
deliberately victimize innocent others.... [TMo deliberately and knowingly
bring a diseased or defective child into the world injures society. [It viery proba-
bly injures the family, and certainly injures the individual who is born in that
[Vol. 31:897
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ing genetic disease.
A cultural lag exists between the medical-biological advances
and the law.28 Physicians have been held liable in wrongful birth
actions29 for failure to use screening devices °.3  A similar cause of
action, wrongful life, is one brought by the diseased child against
the physician for allowing his or her birth.3  As the legal commu-
nity begins to recognize such causes of action, attorneys, judges,
and legislators must be aware of genetic programs and their legal
implications. 32 Furthermore, as more diseases become detectable
through genetic screening, and as society learns more about ge-
condition.. .. [Tihe phrase "communicable disease" [is used] very blandly
these days, as if somehow or other it covered only infectious diseases, not genetic
diseases. But... "typhoid Marys" who carry infectious diseases are no more
blameworthy, ethically speaking, than those who knowingly carry genetic
diseases.
Transcript from Public Broadcasting System (PBS) Series on Bioethics, Genetic Screening
16 (Jan. 1, 1981) [hereinafter cited as PBS Transcript].
28. "Where one part of culture changes first through some discovery or invention, and
occasions changes in some part of culture dependent upon it, there frequently is a de-
lay.... The extent of this lag will vary ... but may exist for. . . years, during which
time there may be said to be a maladjustment.' W. OGBURN, SOCLL CHANGE WITH RE-
SPECT TO CULTURE AND ORIGINAL NATURE 201 (1922).
29. [P]arents of a genetically defective child should have a cause of action when
they can show that the doctor knew or, acting within the standard of care of simi-
larly situated practitioners, should have known of the risk of that disorder, that he
[or she] should have foreseen that such information would be relevant to a rea-
sonable person, and that had these parents known of this possibility, they would
not have had the child. Once these requirements have been met, the parents
should be awarded substantial damages for their emotional anguish and eco-
nomic injury.
Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate
Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE LJ. 1488, 1515 (1978).
30. Physicians have been held liable in wrongful birth actions for failure to detect the
risk that parents may produce a genetically defective child and for inadequately or inaccu-
rately warning these parents of such risk. Giving parents the necessary information to
make thoughtful decisions about childbirth includes explaining screening techniques, often
using a screening device, and interpreting those results accurately. See, e.g., Howard v.
Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 110-13, 366 N.E.2d 64, 64-66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364-66 (1977)
(physician held negligent for failing to detect the parents' risk of producing a child with
Tay-Sachs disease and had to pay medical and funeral expenses although the court denied
the parents' cause of action for emotional distress); Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80,
87-88, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (1977) (court refused to dismiss child's cause of action for
"injuries and conscious pain and suffering" against a physician who gave inaccurate ge-
netic risk information).
31. No courts of last resort have upheld a wrongful life cause of action. Peters &
Peters, WrongulL/fe: Recognizing the Defective Child's Right to a Cause ofAction, 18 DUQ.
L. REv. 857, 857-58 (1980). The authors conclude that the wrongful life action should be
recognized. Id. at 875-76.
32. This Note specifically concerns problems in the legislation of genetic screening
programs and the constitutionality of mandatory programs. For a review of the legal
problems concerning other aspects of genetic screening see, Capron, Tort Liability in Ge-
netic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618 (1979); Murray, Problems Behind the Promise:
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netic disease, larger segments of the public may advocate
mandatory screening programs.33 In the 1960's, a majority of
states legislated mandatory screening programs for newborns. 34
Many of these programs are still in effect. As more people become
aware of the increasing genetic load, the emotional and monetary
costs of genetic disease, and the availability of screening devices,
the demand for mandatory screening programs will become more
acute. 35  To understand the legal problems caused by genetic
screening, an elementary understanding of genetic screening de-
vices and their effects is necessary.
A. Genetic Screening Devices
1. Prenatal Screening
Amniocentesis is an accurate technique by which a fetus can
be tested to determine whether it has a genetic disease.36 At least
sixty genetic diseases can be detected through amniocentesis,37 in-
cluding Tay-Sachs disease,38  sickle cell anemia (SCA), 39 and
Down's syndrome.4' Other methods used to screen prenatally in-
Ethical Issues in Mass Genetic Screening, 2 HASTINGS CENTER REP. No. 2, at 10 (1972);
Peters & Peters, supra note 31; Note, supra note 29.
33. "Society must define the goals of genetic screening. If the techniques only increase
a woman's autonomy over her decisions, then government concerns diminish. If society
sees genetic screening as a tool to decrease the incidence of congenital defects, then the
system requires more complex laws." Feinman, Getting Along With the Genetic Genie, 7
LEGAL ASPECTS MED. PRAc. 37, 43 (1979).
34. See notes 85-90 infra and accompanying text.
35. Feinman, supra note 33, at 41.
36. Recent studies indicate that amniocentesis is 99.4% accurate. National Institute of
Child Health and Human Development National Registry for Amniocentesis Study
Group, MidtrimesterAmniocentesisfor Prenatal Diagnosis, 236 J.A.M.A. 1471, 1475 (1976).
Amniocentesis is performed by inserting a needle into the uterus and removing some of the
amniotic fluid surrounding the fetus. Amniocentesis must be performed after 16 weeks but
prior to the 20th week of pregnancy. It often takes four weeks or longer to get the results.
The risks include hemorrhage, abortion, and injury to the fetus, but the risk level is less
than one percent. See generally Annas & Coyne, supra note 2, at 470-72; Milunsky, Greg-
ory & Lawrence, Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis, 283 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1370 (1970);
Powledge, Prenatal Diagnosis: New Techniques, New Questions, 9 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
No. 3, at 16 (1979); Turnbull, Gregory & Lawrence,AntenatalDiagnosis of FetalAbnormal-
ity with Special Reference to Amniocentesis, 66 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 1115 (1973).
37. S. REP. No. 860, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 9134, 9146.
38. See notes 27 supra and 40 & 112 infra.
39. See notes 40, 53-54 & 112 infra.
40. See notes 27 supra & 51 infra.
This Note emphasizes four major genetic diseases: phenylketonuria (PKU), sickle cell
anemia (SCA), Tay-Sachs disease, and Down's syndrome. These diseases represent a cross
section of the various techniques used in screening programs. Three of the diseases (SCA,
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elude fetoscopy,41  radiography,42  and ultrasound.43  Amni-
ocentesis and the other prenatal screening devices give parents the
option of aborting an affected fetus. Thus, parents who know they
have the chance of producing a child with a genetic disease can
conceive, screen the fetus for the disease, and if the results show
that the child does not have the disease, deliver a healthy child.
The dilemma arises in cases where the fetus is stricken with a ge-
netic disease, and the parents must decide whether to abort the
fetus.44
Prenatal screening, unfortunately, is not helpful in decreasing
the genetic load. Individuals carrying an undesirable trait are
born and may pass on that trait. Ironically, amniocentesis may
increase the genetic load. Previously, a family with a badly dis-
eased child often opted not to risk having a second child, thus
preventing passage of the trait. Presently, parents have the secur-
ity of attempting to have a healthy child and aborting the diseased
fetus. If born, however, the child may pass on the defective ge-
netic trait.
2. Screening Newborns
The most common screening device used on newborns is a
Tay-Sachs, and Down's syndrome), for example, are detectable through amniocentesis.
Children are screened routinely for PKU and SCA. The various diseases also are identifi-
able to a certain group of persons. SCA mainly affects Blacks but also can occur in those
individuals of Latin, Asian, Greek, Indian, Puerto Rican, or Mediterranean origins. Tay-
Sachs disease is most common among Ashkenazic Jews, while PKU often is associated with
the Irish. The incidence of Down's syndrome increases as the mother's age increases and is
especially high in births when mothers are over 35. PKU and SCA have generated exten-
sive legislation at both state and federal levels, including mandatory screening in some
jurisdictions.
41. Fetoscopy is a risky screening procedure which allows visualization of a fetus
through the use of fiber optics. See Emery, Antenatal Diagnosis: Limitations and Future
Prospects, in MEDICAL GENETICS TODAY 289, 294 (X Birth Defects Original Articles Se-
ies, No. 10, D. Bergsma ed. 1974).
42. Radiography is a method used to make photographs from X-rays and can be used
to study the fetus to detect skeletal abnormalities. Id. at 290.
43. Ultrasound is an apparently safe method used to detect regions of altered density
wi.thi the body. This technique is used to discover the position of the fetus, the presence
of twins, and gross structural abnormalities. See Campbell, The Prediction of Fetal Matur-
ity by Ultrasonic Measurement ofthe Bparietal Diameter, 76 J. OBSTET. GYN. B RT. COMM.
603 (1969).
44. It must be remembered that amniocentesis occurs between the 16th and 20th
weeks of pregnancy and that it often takes four weeks to receive the results. Most mothers
are noticeably pregnant by this time (the fifth and sixth months) and may have developed
an emotional tie with the fetus. Thus, to abort also must be viewed in light of others
knowing of the pregnancy and the parents' own ties with the fetus, as well as the parents'
moral attitudes concerning abortion.
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blood test of the infant, usually through a heel prick or a blood
test of the umbilical cord.45 Most infants in this country are tested
at birth for metabolic disorders, including phenylketonuria
(PKU),46 but due to high costs, usually these children are not
screened for chromosomal or other genetic abnormalities.47
PKU48 testing became enormously popular in the 1960's when it
was publicized that a relatively inexpensive screening procedure
could be used to detect PKU and related metabolic disorders,
which in turn could be treated successfully through a specific
diet.4 9 Screening of newborns also can detect the same genetic
diseases that are detectable in children and adults, such as Tay-
Sachs disease and SCA. Testing for such diseases at birth is bene-
ficial to parents who have not been screened because the discovery
of a child with a genetic disorder will inform the parents that fu-
ture children are in danger of inheriting the same disease. The
necessary steps and precautions then may be taken.
3. Screening Children and Adults
Blood tests given to children and adults can detect numerous
genetic diseases.50 In many cases, a genetic disease is obvious
from physical and mental characteristics, but a blood test will ver-
ify the diagnosis.5' Commonly, genetic screening tests are admin-
istered upon school entrance52 and marriage. Giving adults of
childbearing age a screening test informs them initially of their
genetic background and their chances of bearing genetically dis-
45. See Levy, Newborn Screeningfor Metabolic Disorders, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1299 (1973).
46. See notes 83-90 infra and accompanying text.
47. See Annas & Coyne, supra note 2, at 473.
48. Other diseases similar to PKU include maple-syrup-urine disease, homocys-
tinuria, tryosinosis, and galactosemia. Similar in their metabolic origin, these diseases
manifest an absence or deficiency of an enzyme causing a chemical imbalance that can
result in mental and physical problems, including severe mental retardation. Those indi-
viduals suffering from PKU, for example, have high amounts of phenylalanine in their
blood due to the absence of the enzyme phenylalanine hydroxylase. The treatment for
PKU involves a diet low in phenylalanine. This requirement may mean consuming only
specially prepared flour and milk. By adhering to the low phenylalanine diet, a child with
PKU can develop normally. As a child affected with PKU grows older, the brain becomes
less sensitive to the high amount of phenylalanine in the blood so the diet can become less
strict. Id. at 467, 473; PBS Transcript, supra note 27, at 3-4.
49. For a discussion of PKU screening legislation and its subsequent problems and
changes, see notes 85-102 infra and accompanying text.
50. See Annas & Coyne, supra note 2, at 473-74.
51. Down's syndrome, for example, usually is easily detectable because it is mani-
fested by physical characteristics.
52. See note 107 infra and accompanying text.
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eased children. Problems have arisen, however, with administer-
ing screening tests to school-aged children. One problem is that
carriers often are stigmatized or treated as if they had the dis-
ease.5 3 Also, since children are not able to understand fully the
implications of the screening results, the tests may seem unneces-
sary and perhaps be feared. 4
B. Advances in the "Treatment" of Genetic Disease
Very few genetic diseases respond to medical treatment.55 Op-
ponents of genetic screening argue that since there is such a lim-
ited opportunity for treatment of genetic disease, the sole purpose
of screening must be to detect carriers and discourage them from
having children. 6 Advocates of screening answer that all persons
should have the information necessary to make intelligent deci-
sions regarding such important matters as choosing a mate and
bearing children. 7 Advances in artificial insemination 8 and in
53. Some children screened for SCA whose results were positive, for example, were
precluded from physical education classes even though most of them merely carried SCA
and had no need to abstain from physical activities. See PBS Transcript, supra note 27, at
8-9.
54. Id. "Children in school particularly had the finger pointed at them as something
being wrong, because in medicine, we don't test for something unless there's something
wrong with you." Id. at 8.
55. A genetic disease is not curable in the sense that the disease can be eliminated.
Once the defective gene has been passed to a person, it is there for life and can be transmit-
ted to the next generation. There are, however, treatments for certain genetic diseases.
Cleft palate, for example, is an inherited trait. Through surgery, this defect can be cor-
rected physically, but the individual with the cleft palate still carries the responsible gene.
As was discussed in note 48 supra, metabolic disorders can be treated through proper diets.
These diets, however, are dangerous and ultimately may cause physical harm and death.
See Parker, Some LegalAspects of Genetic Counseling, 7 PROGRESS IN MED. GENETICs 217
(1970).
The pain of some genetic diseases, such as SCA, can be treated through medication, but
there is risk of addiction and overdose. There are very few genetic diseases, however, that
can be treated effectively. Moreover, there is no way, short of not having natural children,
that a person with a genetic defect can avoid the risk of passing that defect onto his or her
offspring. For a general discussion of treatments and proposed treatments of genetic dis-
ease, see Rimoin, The Medical Genetics Clinic and Community Health, in BIRTH DEFECTS
67 (Birth Defects Original Articles Series No. I, D. Bergsma ed. 1970).
56. See P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW, AND SOCIAL POLICY 67 (1977); Annas & Coyne,
supra note 2, at 485 n.90.
57. See P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 147-48; PBS Transcript, supra note 27, at 7.
58. Artificial insemination is a technique by which a woman is impregnated with
sperm from a donor through mechanical means. The donor could be the woman's hus-
band, friend, or an unknown male. Where the man carries a genetic disease or trait and the
woman does not, artificial insemination with another man's sperm offers the couple one
means to have healthy children. Technologically, artificial insemination is nearing perfec-
tion. There even have been normal births of healthy infants from semen that has been
frozen for three years. See Gorney, The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15 U.C.L.A.
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vitro fertilization59 offer couples new choices as these individuals
determine the genetic risks involved in having their own natural
children. Couples also may adopt children if they think that the
risk of producing genetically diseased children is too great. Artifi-
cial insemination and in vitro fertilization, when used correctly,60
not only give prospective parents new options concerning
childbearing, but unlike the use of amniocentesis, help to reduce
the genetic load. For this reason, these techniques are widely ad-
vocated as the appropriate methods for having children if the risk
of genetic disease exists.61
L. REv. 273, 293 (1968). See generally Annas, Art'?fcial Insemination: Beyond the Best In-
terests of the Donor, 9 HASTINGS CENTER REP. No. 4, at 14 (1979).
There are genetic problems since the records kept at a donor's clinic are not always
accurate or even informative about donor's genetic diseases. All donors should be screened
before donation to avoid spreading deleterious genes to future generations. Additionally,
the legal problems surrounding artificial insemination still are unresolved. The growing
trend is that the husband of the artificially inseminated woman is the legal father of the
child if he has consented to the procedure. See C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d
821 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977) (donor, although not married to the baby's mother,
held to be the baby's father and granted visitation rights); Adoption of Anonymous, 74
Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (child born as a result of artificial insemina-
tion by a donor is the natural and legitimate child of the natural mother and her husband if
the husband consented to the artificial insemination).
59. In vitro fertilization (IVF) is the process by which the immature ova are removed
from a woman and fertilized. The product of this conception is transplanted into a wo-
man's uterus several days later. See Edwards, Barrister & Steptol, Early Stages of Fertiliza-
tion In Vitro of Human Oocytes Matured In Vitro, 221 NATURE 632 (1969). See also
Cohen, The "Brave New Baby" and the Law: Fashioning Remedies/or the Victims of In
Vitro Fertilization, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 319 (1978).
The birth of the first "test-tube" baby, Louise Brown, on July 26, 1978, occurred
through in vitro fertilization. See "Test-Tube" Baby Born-It's a Girl and She's Doing
Fine, Boston Globe, July 26, 1978, at 1; The Lovely Louise, The London Daily Mail, July
26, 1978, at 1. See generally The First Test-Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978, at 58.
IVF could prove to be the counterpart of artificial insemination because of its utility to
aid those couples where only one partner has a detectable genetic disease or trait. Women
with the disease or trait could have their husband's sperm used to impregnate a donor's
egg, and the conceptus (product of the conception) could be implanted in the woman with
the genetic defect. Presently, IVF is being used when the woman who donates the egg is
also the woman who is implanted with the conceptus. As IVF is perfected, a woman will
be able to donate eggs to an "egg-bank" in the same way men presently can donate sperm.
See Kass, Making Babies: The New Biology and the "Old" Morality, 26 PUa. INTEREST 18,
23-25 (1972). For a discussion of eight ways to create a baby, see J. FLETCHER, supra note
17, at 40-41.
60. Again, the warning is that unless all prospective donors are screened for genetic
defects and their donations marked properly with accurate, inclusive genetic data, the risk
remains that the donee will choose a donor with the same or another genetic defect.
61. Gorney, supra note 58, at 293. In the extreme, some individuals advocate steriliza-
tion of those persons with genetic disease that should not be passed on, leaving the latter
with only the choices of having no children or having children through adoption, artificial
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C. Negative and Positive Eugenics
Eugenics is the science of genetic planning and improve-
ment.62 The concept of eugenics originated in ancient Greece,63
but was revived at the turn of this century.6 There are two types
of eugenics practiced-negative eugenics and positive eugenics.
Negative eugenics involves the prevention of genetically defective
conceptions and can be accomplished through persuading those
persons with a high probability of passing on a defective gene not
to reproduce.65 Artificial insemination is an example of a negative
eugenics practice. Those individuals at high risk of passing on a
genetic disease are persuaded not to reproduce naturally but to
use artificial insemination by a genetically healthy donor.66 Steri-
lization is another example of a negative eugenics procedure
which prevents the occurrence of defective conceptions.67
Positive eugenics involves selective breeding to reduce the ge-
netic load and increase superior and favorable genetic qualities.6 8
A special use of artificial insemination provides an example of a
positive eugenics practice. This special use involves the artificial
insemination of women with sperm from a specific class of donors,
such as Nobel Prize recipients. The donors must be screened for
genetic defects and then studied for special qualities one would
like to see propagated throughout society. Under a positive
eugenics policy, many individuals would be prohibited from bear-
ing children, while others, through artificial insemination and in
vitro fertilization would bear several children.6 9
insemination, or in vitro fertilization. Dobzhansky, Man and Natural Selection, 49 AM.
SCIENTIST 285 (1961).
62. Eugenics is the science that concerns those influences upon individuals that better
future generations, both physically and morally.
63. "[Eugenics] is not a new concept. Over 2,000 years ago, in his masterpiece The
Republic, Plato envisioned a state headed by philosopher rulers who were given the power
to decide which married couples could procreate." Feinman,.supra note 33, at 37.
64. The beginnings of modern eugenics in this country are found in the early steriliza-
tion laws. Those laws typically ordered sterilization for criminals, the chronically poor,
and those individuals with mental retardation, mental disorders, and epilepsy. See C.
DARwIN, THE ORIGIN OF THE SPECiEs 80 (1859); Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterili-
zation theAnxwer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591 (1966).
65. Gorey, supra note 58, at 293.
66. See note 58 upra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
68. Gomey, supra note 58, at 294.
69. Positive eugenics often is viewed as more threatening than negative eugenics.
Gorey, supra note 58, at 293. This viewpoint probably results because both good and bad
genetic traits are considered. The problem of who decides whether traits are good or bad
becomes even more important Id. at 293-95.
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Some physicians, counselors, and scientists think that the only
valid purpose associated with genetic counseling is personal coun-
seling of the family. These professionals believe that "a genetic
counselor's job should not, in any way, be construed as eugenic in
practice."7 °
Counselling based on statistical projections for future genera-
tions (e.g., the effect on gene frequency of sickle cell anemia if
all [carriers] are counseled to forego having offspring) fails to
weigh compassionately the needs of the unborn fetus and [its]
parents, just as it fails to meet the likelihood of effective treat-
ment for the disease. Thus, the counselor who acts as an agent
of eugenic policy, must in the long run shortchange his [or her]
patients-fail in his [or her] role as physician.'
A contrary view proposes that genetic counseling should go
beyond the best interests of the individual family under counsel
and instead strive to reduce the genetic load, thus benefitting the
entire population.72 Those individuals taking an intermediate po-
sition may subscribe to a eugenics policy but think that they
should not influence their clients' decisions in favor of such a pol-
icy.73 Although many of these counselors strive for objectivity,
their personal views may nevertheless be influential.74 As the se-
verity of the genetic disease increases, the goal of objectivity be-
comes more difficult to maintain.75 In counseling a client, for
example, who is pregnant with a fetus with Tay-Sachs disease, a
genetic counselor's opinion about the severity and hopelessness of
the disease 76 might lead him or her to counsel aborting the fetus.
"It would be unrealistic to expect genetic counselors to suppress
completely such strongly held views."77 Although genetic coun-
selors do have the opportunity to advise clients consistent with a
eugenics policy, clients do not always heed such advice.78 It is
difficult, therefore, to ascertain the influence genetic counselors
70. Lapi$, The Genetic Counselor. Responsible to Whom?, I HASTINGS CENTER REP.
No. 2, at 6 (1971). "The genetic counselor's obligation. . . never should extend beyond
the family within his [or her] purview. If we are a society interested in 'genetic improve-
ment of the stock,' this is ajob for some other professional or governmental body-it is not
to be the [genetic counselor's] stock and trade!" Id.
71. Id. at 8.
72. See J. FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 48-50; P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 152-63.
73. See Lapp6, supra note 70.
74. Id.
75. See P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 156-57.
76. See note 112 infra.
77. P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 157.
78. Research findings indicate that two out of every six couples decide to continue the
pregnancy after learning of the diseased fetus. See J. FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 49.
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have over their clients.79
Other individuals argue that eugenic goals are wrong and im-
moral because these goals cause unnatural behavior. In reply, it
has been argued:
Man is very much a part of nature. He has always used his
genius to preserve and enhance the quality of life. To this end,
man has developed medical science and a vast variety of tech-
nical tools and luxuries. But medical science has upset natural
selection. Technical developments. . have increased the mu-
tation rate in man. Accordingly, man's genetic load is increas-
ing. Thus, man has already "intervened in nature" and acted
"unnaturally.' The decision now is in what direction shall man
continue to direct his evolution.80
The key legal issue in eugenics is who will decide which traits
are desirable. Political, moral, and ethical problems must be con-
sidered in the resolution of this issue.s ' Legislative enactments
and judicial decisions have illustrated the law's ability to draw
lines in controversial areas."2 The question of who will decide ul-
timately the desirability of a given trait is not ripe for decision,
since it has not been established that any type of eugenics program
would be permissible in this country. The current issue, conse-
quently, is whether genetic screening should be mandated by law.
Such a mandatory screening program is only one step in the im-
plementation of any eugenics program.
79. For a good review of legal problems involving genetic counselors, their standards
of care, and potential liabilities, see Capron, supra note 32; Note, supra note 29.
80. Crow, supra note 22, at 430.
81. Dobzhansky advocates evaluating each genetic condition on its own merits. If a
person carries a genetic trait that has been considered and ruled to be one that should not
be passed on, then that person should be sterilized. The author also thinks that all terribly
deformed, uncorrectable fetuses should be aborted. Dobzhansky, supra note 61. Those
individuals opposed to Dobzhansky's view believe such a consideration of each genetic
defect and ultimate sterilization will lead to abuse and misuse. It may be decided, for
example, that microcephalics are fetuses that should be aborted. The next step might be
aborting fetuses with cleft palates. Joseph Fletcher's retort to this "slippery slope" argu-
ment is that surgeons often amputate legs with gangrene, yet they have not decided to
amputate legs with poison ivy. See J. FLErCHER, supra note 17, at 33. Fletcher thinks it is
inhuman to have the knowledge necessary to increase the quality of life for human off-
spring and not to use that knowledge. "Surely, when [a society has] the necessary know-
ledge to prevent the birth of a seriously diseased person [society has] the responsibility to
do so, out of loving concern for human beings." PBS Transcript, supra note 27, at 18
(remarks of Joseph Fletcher).
82. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Court weighed the state's, fetus', and
mother's interests in abortion and drew lines based on these competing interests); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidation of a death penalty statute).
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II. PRESENT GENETIC SCREENING LEGISLATION AND ITS
BACKGROUND
Screening statutes of some type currently are in effect in a ma-
jority of the states83 and at the federal level.84 To create a genetic
screening statute which will survive future constitutional scrutiny,
it is necessary to understand the present screening laws and their
background.
A. PKU Screening Laws
During the mid-1960's, popular science writers reported a
breakthrough in the treatment of PKU,85 a relatively rare genetic
disorder which accounts for less than one percent of institutional-
ized retarded children.86 The literature unfortunately gave the lay
reader the impression that medical science fully understood PKU
and was capable of PKU's accurate diagnosis and effective treat-
ment. 7 Readers were excited by the prospect of a cure for mental
retardation caused by PKU.'8 Apparently, a simple, inexpensive
blood test at birth could indicate whether a child had the disease,
and if the results were positive, a special diet could be imple-
mented to affect a cure.8 9 State legislatures throughout the coun-
try passed laws requiring or recommending a blood test at birth
for the purpose of screening newborns. Between 1963 and 1967,
forty-one states passed PKU screening laws, with most of these
states requiring mandatory screening.90
In retrospect, the PKU legislation was premature. The PKU
laws have epitomized how not to legislate in the genetic field.9 '
83. See note 90 infra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 145-68 infra and accompanying text.
85. See note 48 supra. A child's chance of inheriting PKU is I in 15,000. See P.
REILLY, supra note 56, at 59.
86. See Annas & Coyne, supra note 2, at 481.
87. See Swazey, Phenylketonurix 4 Case Study in Biomedical Legislation, 48 J. URB.
L. 883 (1971). In fact, the treatment for PKU was controversial and sometimes dangerous.
Id. at 900-01.
88. Id. at 908.
89. See Annas & Coyne, supra note 2, at 481.
90. By 1977, 42 states had adopted PKU screening laws. 36 of the 42 states required
mandatory screening. 27 of the states had a policy of exempting infants from testing if the
infant's parents objected to screening on religious grounds, and three states exempted test-
ing of infants merely for parental objection. Five states left the discretionary power in the
Department of Health to institute mandatory screening, and one state had a voluntary
program. In five states, failure to comply with the screening law constituted a misde-
meanor. Only nine states had treatment provisions. See id. at 908-14; Grant, Genetic Con-
trol and the Law, 1978 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 306, 319.
91. See Swazey, supra note 87, at 920.
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Both the screening device and the treatment are not the panacea
that the public and the legislators anticipated.92 When the federal
legislature attempted to develop a national PKU screening pro-
gram in 1967, the proposed bill died in committee.93 A major
reason for the bill's failure was the criticism it received from the
American Academy of Pediatrics' Subcommittee on Legislation.
This subcommittee stated that the bill was a "poor piece of legisla-
tion... with noble aims, but based upon unwarranted medical
assumptions." 94 The subcommittee requested that the funds ex-
pended on such legislation be spent on further research in the
field.95
There were several problems with the initial PKU laws, most
of which remain uncorrected. Two main problems were the use of
a rudimentary diagnostic test 96 and a treatment administered
before its effects were known.9' The majority of the PKU statutes
also lacked provisions for data collection, storage of data, and
confidentiality of results,98 and most statutes contained no provi-
sions for counseling99 or treatment." Other problems included
the lack of provisions for education concerning genetic disease,101
both privately and professionally, and the failure of most state
statutes to provide for quality control in the screening
procedure. 102
B. Sickle Cell Anemia Statutes
The predominantly mandatory PKU screening laws of the
1960's seemed to lead to a "screening mentality" in the state legis-
latures.10 3 As a result, in the early 1970's, twenty states passed
genetic screening statutes for another genetic disease, sickle cell
92. "In regard to the laws on PKU, the public and the legislatures have been
led to believe that a higher degree of certainty exists in our medical understanding
than now appears to be the case." Bessman, Legislation and Advances in Medical
Knowledge-4cceleration or Inhibition?, 69 J. PEoiArTics 334, 337 (1966).
93. See Swazey, supra note 87, at 914.
94. New ChildHealth Legislative Bills Proposed-4cademy Subcommittee Issues Guide-
lines, I BULL. PEDIATRIC PRAC. [American Academy of Pediatrics] 1-2 (1967).
95. Id.
96. See Swazey, supra note 87, at 891-99.
97. Id. at 899-908.
98. See notes 387-90 infra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 381-86 infra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 391-92 infra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 393-94 infra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 378-80 infra and accompanying text. See generally P. REILLY, supra
note 56, at 54-56; Swazey, supra note 87, at 908-14.
103. PBS Transcript, supra note 27, at 4.
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anemia (SCA).1°1 Some of these statutes made testing mandatory
for certain classifications of people.10 5 There was a basic differ-
ence, however, between the screening test used for PKU and that
used for SCA. The PKU screening device informed those individ-
uals tested whether they had the disease. The SCA test could not
differentiate between those persons afflicted with sickle cell dis-
ease and those individuals merely carrying the sickle cell trait. 0 6
This ambiguity led to confusion for school children who tested
positive because they were treated as though they had the disease,
while most often they had only the sickle cell trait.1 7 These chil-
dren were given special diets, detained from physical education
classes, and generally treated as if something were wrong with
them.' Adult carriers of SCA were barred from certain jobs,
and various insurance companies raised the cost of insurance for
sickle cell carriers. 09 The black community, consequently, sug-
gested that the sickle cell screening program was a method used
by the Whites in America to reduce and ultimately eliminate the
black population. By 1972, black leaders sought to repeal the very
SCA statutes they previously had requested." 0
Part of the SCA screening problem can be explained by exam-
ining the characteristics of SCA and the screening tests formerly
available. The only way to eliminate a genetic disease with the
characteristics of SCA is to halt the reproduction of children with
SCA. During the early 1970's, SCA, unlike a disease such as Tay-
Sachs, could not be detected through amniocentesis.' Thus, ex-
pectant parents at risk of producing a child with the sickle cell
trait or disease did not have the benefit of amniocentesis and had
to wait for newborn screening to determine whether their child
was affected with the disease. "2 Moreover, very few of those indi-
104. Part of the reason SCA became the focus of attention at this time was because
black leaders were insisting that physicians and politicians deal with SCA. Id. at 4-5. See
Scott, Health Care Priority and Sickle Cell Anemia, 214 J.A.M.A. 731 (1970).
105. See Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 1, at 704-06.
106. Those individuals with sickle cell trait rarely experience any symptoms of sickle
cell disease. These people can lead quite normal lives but must remember the possibility of
passing on the sickle cell trait or disease to their offspring should their mate also have the
sickle cell trait or disease.
107. PBS Transcript, supra note 27, at 6-8.
108. Id. at 8.
109. Id. at 9.
110. See P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 67; Annas & Coyne, supra note 2, at 485 n.90.
111. See notes 40 supra & 112 infra.
112. Recently, an amniocentesis screening device to detect SCA in utero has been de-
veloped. This device is not as accurate as the other tests but has been used successfully.
This new procedure will give those individuals with SCA the opportunity to use prenatal
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viduals screened and counseled for SCA understood the informa-
tion given to them, and many of them thought that it was another
form of stigmatization by Whites." 3 These problems with the
SCA screening laws were alleviated significantly by a federal SCA
screening statute.
In May, 1972, Congress enacted the National Sickle Cell Ane-
mia Control Act.' 14 The Act's purpose was to "establish a na-
tional program for diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of sickle
cell anemia together with screening and counseling programs and
informational programs.""' 5 The federal law made screening vol-
untary" 6 and also funded voluntary state screening programs.17
The Act gave the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
(currently the Secretary of Health and Human Services) the au-
thority to enter "into contracts with public and private entities, for
projects" for research, treatment, educational and counseling pro-
grams." 8 The Act required confidentiality of screening results.
These results, however, could be used in statistical studies and re-
leased with proper individual consent." 9 The Act also required
that first priority be given for screening and counseling services to
persons entering their childbearing years; second priority went to
diagnosis and the option of aborting an affected fetus. PBS Transcript, supra note 27, at
11-13. In comparing prenatal screening for SCA with that for Tay-Sachs disease, an im-
portant distinction should be remembered--the difference in severity of the diseases.
Those individuals with Tay-Sachs disease face inevitable death at the age of three to five
years. There is no cure, and the disease is very painful. Those individuals with SCA often
live normal lives with few restrictions. Some individuals with SCA have other blood char-
acteristics that keep them virtually free of SCA's debilitating effects. Others, however, do
suffer greatly and lead less than normal lives. Despite these hardships, those persons af-
fected with SCA do not face a disease of the same severity as Tay-Sachs disease.
113. P. REILLY, supra note 56.
James Bowman of the University of Chicago School of Medicine, began to argue
that compulsory [SCA] screening laws, ostensibly designed to help blacks, could
boomerang into a novel source of discrimination .... Inevitably, as black citi-
zens realized that sickle cell disease could only be reduced by influencing repro-
ductive behavior, there were cries of genocide.
Id. at 67. See also PBS Transcript, supra note 27, at 7-10.
114. National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-294, 86 Stat. 136 (1972)
(repealed 1976).
115. H.R. REP. No. 923, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2263, 2263-64.
116. "The participation by any individual in any program or portion thereof under this
[title] shall be wholly voluntary and shall not be a prerequisite to eligibility for or receipt of
any other service or assistance from, or to participation in, any other program?' National
Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-294, § 1103, 86 Stat. 136 (1972) (repealed
1976).
117. Id. § 1102.
118. Id. § 1101(a)(1).
119. Id. § 1104(a)(2).
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children under age seven. 120
Although this federal statute was more thoughtfully con-
structed than most state laws, 21 problems remained. The con-
gressional declaration of purpose, for example, provided that
"sickle cell anemia is a debilitating, inheritable disease that afflicts
approximately two million American citizens and has been largely
neglected."' 122 It is true that while two million American citizens
have the sickle cell gene, most of these persons are merely SCA
carriers and fewer than 50,000 actually suffer from the disease.12'
Thus, the differentiation between sickle cell carriers and those in-
dividuals afflicted with sickle cell disease was not recognized by
the federal legislators.' 24 As with the PKU statutes, SCA statutes
were promulgated when the SCA test was not perfected' 2 -a fact
which added to the criticism of the statutes. 126
C. Statutory Refinement of the Initial PKU and SCA Screening
Laws
Both state and federal lawmakers responded to criticism of
earlier screening laws by enacting new genetic screening statutes.
The model state statute is Maryland's. 27  Unlike past genetic
screening legislation, this statute exhibits thoughtful planning and
drafting. At the federal level, Congress responded to the previous
problems of genetic screening legislation by repealing the 1972
National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act and replacing it with a
120. Id. § 1104(a)(4).
121. Many state laws demonstrated that their creators were unknowledgeable about
SCA. The Georgia legislature created a bill entitled "Education-Immunization for Sickle
Cell Anemia Required for Admission to Public Schools" (emphasis added). The title, how-
ever, was not placed in the code. The Louisiana legislature provided for the special dietary
needs of children with SCA. These legislators apparently were assuming that since PKU
could be treated through a diet so could SCA. See P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 68. An-
other problem involved the placement of SCA legislation. Some states attached the SCA
sections to those dealing with communicable diseases such as syphilis. This attachment
only enhanced the potential stigma attached to SCA. Id. at 69. For other examples of
SCA screening statutes and their problems, see id. at 65-72; Waltz & Thigpen, supra note I,
at 704-06.
122. National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-294, § 1 102(a)(7), 86
Stat. 136 (1972) (repealed 1976).
123. P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 68.
124. See notes 106-10 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems
associated with the failure to differentiate between sickle cell carriers and those individuals
with sickle cell disease.
125. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
126. P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 72-73.
127. Id. at 100. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 814-821 (1957).
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broader and better planned screening statute.1 28
The Maryland statute is more general than most statutes be-
cause it does not mention specific diseases but treats many genetic
diseases. As such, the statute applies to more varied screening
programs.129 The statute begins with a section listing legislative
findings and declarations.1 3° This section indicates the problems
associated with past screening laws according to the Maryland
legislature. One provision, for example, states that carriers of ge-
netic disorders should not be stigmatized or discriminated
against 131 and that the screening should be voluntary and strictly
confidential. 132 This statement indicates the Maryland legislators'
concern with these issues which were handled inappropriately by
other genetic screening statutes.
A novel aspect of the Maryland law is the creation of a com-
mission to oversee the administration of the genetic screening stat-
ute.' 33 The commission's powers include: the establishment of
regulations for the detection and management of hereditary disor-
ders; the control of information about genetic disorders; the au-
thority to investigate charges of discrimination against a person
with a hereditary disorder; and continuous reevaluation of the
screening statute.' 34 The commission, however, cannot establish
rules or principles contrary to those rules listed by the legislature
in section 818.135 These legislative restrictions dictate the follow-
ing: a screening program cannot require "mandatory participa-
tion, restriction of childbearing, or be a prerequisite to eligibility
for, or receipt of any other service or assistance from or to partici-
pation in any other program;" 136 informative and nondirective
128. National Sickle Cell Anemia, Cooley's Anemia, Tay-Sachs, and Genetic Disease
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-278, 90 Stat. 407 (1976) (amended 1978). For a discussion of this Act,
see notes 145-68 infra and accompanying text.
129. See Powledge, New Trends in Genetic Legislation, 3 HASTINGS CENTER REP. No.
6, at 6 (1973).
130. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 814 (1957). Included is a finding that genetic screening
for some hereditary disorders can lead to the alleviation of the problems associated with
the disorder and can help in the future understanding of hereditary disorders and their
eventual alleviation or cure. Id. § 814(c).
131. Id. § 814(f). The legislature's concern with the stigma carried by those individuals
with the SCA trait accounts for the failure to proscribe discrimination against persons af-
flicted with SCA. P. REILLY, sujpra note 56, at 99.
132. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 8140) (1957).
133. Id. § 814(k).
134. Id. § 817.
135. Id. § 818.
136. Id. § 818(0.
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counseling must be available to all individuals; 137 pretesting coun-
seling must be available to explain the risks, costs, and possible
results of the test(s);13 8 and test results are to be confidential, with
provision for statistical analysis and informed consent for release
of the data.
139
The Maryland law, though approved as a model statute,14 0 has
not been adopted in other states. The Washington legislature in-
troduced a statute virtually identical to the Maryland law, but due
to funding considerations, the proposal did not become law.' 4'
Lack of financial resources may explain why a carefully written
statute such as Maryland's has not been widely adopted. A statute
requiring only a simple blood test at birth is certainly less expen-
sive to implement than a comprehensive program such as Mary-
land's 142  which furnishes treatment, counseling, and other
services, but the cheaper program is also inadequate compared to
the Maryland system. 4 3 There also have been recent changes
made by some states contrary to the Maryland model provisions.
Arizona, for example, passed a law requiring mandatory prenatal
screening to detect metabolic disorders.44
Congress responded to the inadequacies of the 1972 SCA stat-
ute by enacting the National Sickle Cell Anemia, Cooley's Ane-
mia, Tay-Sachs, and Genetic Diseases Act (Genetic Diseases
Act). 145 Genetic diseases other than sickle cell anemia were in-
cluded in the Act's provisions, enabling more Americans to share
in the nation's health resources. 146 Dissatisfaction with the ad-
137. Id. § 818(g).
138. Id. § 818(h).
139. Id. § 818(i)-O).
140. See Powledge, note 129 supra, at 7.
141. P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 101. The present law is found at WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 70.83.010-.83.050 (West Supp. 1980).
142. The New York statute, for example, requires that tests be administered to detect
PKU, SCA, and other diseases, but exemptions are allowed for parental religious objec-
tions. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-a (McKinney 1977). In 1977, this program cost
New York approximately $250,000. P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 97.
143. Funding also became an issue in the administration of the federal law concerning
genetic screening. See notes 147-48 infra and accompanying text.
144. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-694(B) (West Supp. 1980).
145. National Sickle Cell Anemia, Cooley's Anemia, Tay-Sachs, and Genetic Diseases
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-278, 90 Stat. 407 (1976) (amended 1978).
146. H.R. REP. No. 498, supra note 27, at 20-21, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 709, at 728-29. Congress stated the purpose of the Act as follows:
In order to preserve and protect the health and welfare of all citizens, it is the
purpose of this title.., to establish a national program to provide for basic and
applied research, research training, testing, counseling, and information and edu-
cation programs with respect to genetic disease, and genetic conditions, such as
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ministration of this Act of 1976, however, compelled Congress to
amend the Act in 1978.147 The program was to be administered
by the Health Services Administration (HSA), but Congress was
"deeply concerned" about HSA's approach. 4 Congress, conse-
quently, reinterpreted the Act to ensure that its future manage-
ment reflected congressional intent.
Moreover, Congress designed the 1978 Genetic Diseases Act to
be flexible. The Act was designed to incorporate new scientific
and medical advances that are made in the genetic field by provid-
ing genetic services. 149 These services include: "1. Early detec-
tion of disease; (a) Newborn screening, (b) Prenatal screening,
(c) Prenatal diagnosis, (d) Screening at later ages; 2. Carrier de-
tection; 3. Counseling; 4. Diagnosis and monitoring effectiveness
of treatment; and 5. Information and education."'' 50  The first
three years of the 1976 Act exhibited limited progress due to the
lack of planning provisions for "research, training, counseling,
and the detection, prevention and treatment of genetic disease
.... "'15 The amended Genetic Diseases Act provides for plan-
ning 52 and program evaluation.15 3
The federal statute is similar to Maryland's screening law 5 4 as
Sickle Cell anemia, Cooley's anemia, Tay-Sachs disease, cystic fibrosis,
dysautonomia, hemophilia, retinitis pigmentosa, Huntington's chorea, muscular
dystrophy, and genetic conditions leading to mental retardation. . . or geneti-
cally caused mental disorders.
Pub. L. No. 94-278, § 402, 90 Stat. 407 (1976) (amended 1978).
147. Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-626, 92 Stat. 3583. Although funds were
authorized for 1977, the program was not funded until 1978. The authorization for 1978
was $30 million. Only $4 million actually was allocated. S. REP. No. 860, supra note 37, at
32-33, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9134, at 9165-66.
148. Id. at 33, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9134, at 9166. Con-
gress was concerned deeply about the approach the HSA was taking in its implementation
of the Genetic Diseases Act. The HSA was "locking itself into a definition of genetic dis-
eases to be covered" by the Act. This definition meant that only a few genetic diseases
were dealt with under the 1976 Act.
149. "The committee's bill stresses noncategorical initiatives in comprehensive genetic
services based on effective planning, evaluation, and needs assessment. The bill further
broadens the scope of its coverage to include 'genetic conditions leading to mental retarda-
tion or mental illness, and conditions requiring genetic services."' Id., reprintedin [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9134, at 9166.
150. Id. at 33-34, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9134, at 9166-67.
151. Id. at 33, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9134, at 9167.
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 300b(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
153. Id. § 300b-3(d). "IT]he Secretary shall. . . [develop] a procedure under which
persons from among members of the general public and from among leading medical or
scientific authorities... will have the opportunity on a regular basis to make recommen-
dations to the Secretary." Id.
154. See notes 127-39 supra and accompanying text.
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it provides for education of the public and professionals regarding
genetic disease and services.'55 Participation in such a program is
voluntary and is not a prerequisite to eligibility for other pro-
grams. 156 Screening results are strictly confidential unless waived
through informed consent or for statistical purposes.157 The Act
provides for counseling concerning genetic disease 158 and the de-
velopment of special programs to train genetic counselors.159 Ad-
ditionally, there are provisions for treatment 6 and research 16 1 of
genetic disease. Finally, funding is available to private and public
groups for research, screening programs, counseling services, and
dissemination of educational materials.' 62 Eligibility for fund-
ing requires that programs be voluntary 163 and results be
confidential.'I 4
Congress realized that the 1978 Genetic Diseases Act was a
"significant new initiative which [would] require new staff posi-
tions to insure the intelligent expenditures of funds and careful
implementation of programs."' 165 Congress, therefore, urged the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to create new positions
and authorized $45 million annually for fiscal years 1979, 1980,
and 1981.166 Congress also authorized the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research to do a study on the "ethical, social, and legal im-
plications of voluntary testing, counseling, and information and
education programs with respect to genetic diseases."' 67 Congress
hoped the study would clarify the implications of mandatory ver-
sus voluntary screening, which indicates that Congress has not yet
rejected the idea of mandatory genetic screening programs.' 68
155. 42 U.S.C. § 300b(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
156. Id. § 300b-2.
157. Id. § 300b-3(a)(2).
158. Id. §§ 300b(a)(1), 300b-1(4), -4, -6.
159. Id. § 300b-1(2).
160. Id. §§ 300b-1(4), -4, -6.
161. Id. § 300b-1.
162. Id. § 300b.
163. Id. § 300b-2.
164. Id. § 300b-3(a)(2).
165. S. REP. No. 860, supra note 37, at 35, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 9134, at 9168.
166. Id., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9134, at 9168.
167. Id., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9134, at 9168.
168. Id., reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9134, at 9168.
[Vol. 31:897
GENETIC SCREENING STATUTES
Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A MANDATORY GENETIC
SCREENING PROGRAM
Mandatory genetic screening may be attacked under four ma-
jor constitutional doctrines: the fourth amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches; 16 9 the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of due process of law 70 and equal protection of the
laws;"' and the first amendment's assurance that the freedom to
exercise religion will not be abridged." 2 To understand the focus
of attack under each doctrine, it is necessary to view genetic
screening in two distinct ways. In some instances, the act of
screening itself-the drawing of blood or amniotic fluid-is under
attack. In other instances, the effects of screening are under at-
tack. An individual testing positive, for example, might next un-
dergo counseling.17 3 Although counseling is designed to be
objective,174 it ultimately may have the effect of causing an indi-
vidual to make critical decisions concerning marriage and
childbearing. Because positive screening results may impact on
these fundamental decisions, the constitutionality of the counsel-
ing and the actual blood test must be scrutinized.
A. The Fourth Amendment-Protection From Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures
The fourth amendment 17 attack would be brought against the
actual screening procedures-the blood test and amniocentesis.
Although fourth amendment arguments involving illegal searches
169. See notes 175-225 infra and accompanying text.
170. See notes 226-83 infra and accompanying text.
171. See notes 284-330 infra and accompanying text.
172. See notes 331-70 infra and accompanying text.
173. Some physicians, counselors, and scientists believe that genetic counseling should
be tailored to meet the needs of the particular family under counsel. See Lapl6, supra note
70.
A contrary view proposes that counseling should be aimed at reducing the genetic load.
See J. FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 48-50; P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 52-63. See also
notes 70-75 supra and accompanying text.
174. Although many counselors strive for objectivity, their personal views nevertheless
may be influential. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
175. The fourth amendment reads:
Mhe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
The fourth amendment is enforceable against the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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and seizures usually concern physical property, for nearly a cen-
tury, the right to be free from such searches has involved more
than the unlawful search of property.'7 6 The right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures includes protection from un-
reasonable bodily intrusions such as mandatory blood tests. 177
Compelled blood tests, however, have survived constitutional
scrutiny in some cases.'78 In Schmerber v. Calffornia,79 Justice
Brennan upheld a compelled blood test but warned:
The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of
our society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not
forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body
under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it
permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other
conditions. '8 0
In determining the constitutionality of a mandatory blood test
or amniocentesis for genetic screening, the requirements of a legal
search must be examined. The Constitution guarantees to all per-
sons that their private lives will be protected from unwarranted
governmental intrusion.' "[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected."' 8 2  The fourth amendment provides that
searches are unlawful unless a warrant has been obtained'83 and
that probable cause must be shown to obtain a warrant. 18 4
176. "The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security. . . . It is not the breaking of his doors. . but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property. Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
177. The compelled puncture of skin and the extraction of blood are considered
searches under the fourth amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)
(search was held to be reasonable since probable cause was shown). See note 178 infra.
See also People v. Duroncelay, 146 Cal. App. 96, 303 P.2d 617 (1956); Block v. People, 125
Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512 (1951).
178. The involuntary drawing of blood has been upheld in both criminal and civil
cases. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood test upheld when used to
determine if defendant was intoxicated after he had been involved in an automobile acci-
dent and appeared drunk); Jordan v. Davis, 143 Me. 185, 57 A.2d 209 (1948) (involuntary
blood test upheld in bastardy proceeding); Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d
717 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950) (involuntary drawing of blood upheld in paternity
proceeding).
179. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See notes 177-78 supra.
180. 384 U.S. at 772.
181. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (electronic surveillance of a
public telephone booth without a warrant held an illegal search).
182. Id. "Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from
unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 359.
183. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
184. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1967).
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"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment ..... "85 If these constitutional princi-
ples concluded the inquiry, screening procedures, to be held con-
stitutionally valid, would have to require a warrant to screen each
individual. In some situations, however, warrants are easily ob-
tainable 18 6 or unnecessary. 187
In Camara v. Municial Court,'88 the Supreme Court held that
persons inspecting for safety, fire, health, and related violations
could not demand to enter private homes and other premises
without a search warrant.18 9 The Camara Court was concerned
with arbitrary governmental invasion. 90 The government as-
serted that warrantless administrative searches were necessary to
protect the public health and safety of urban populations. ' 9' The
Court held that "the burden of obtaining a warrant. . . [was not]
likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search." 92
Thus, the Court required a warrant, 93 overruling past cases which
had permitted such searches without a warrant.194 Nevertheless,
the holding was not as strict as it seemed, since the Court held that
the various inspectors did not have to show probable cause of a
specific violation to obtain the warrant. 195 "If a valid public inter-
est justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable
cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant."' 196
The government may avoid fourth amendment problems with
genetic screening by seeking a Camara-type warrant. Authorities
185. 389 U.S. at 357. Exceptions to the general rule can be found in Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (warrantless search permitted if justified on "hot pursuit"
grounds); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (no warrant is needed if person
searched has consented); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (warrantless search
permitted if incident to a lawful arrest).
186. See notes 188-96 infra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 200-214 infra and accompanying text.
188. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
189. Id. at 540. The holding was limited to nonemergency situations in which immedi-
ate access is not required.
190. Id. at 528.
191. Id. at 533.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 533-34.
194. Camara overruled, in part, Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960); Frank v. Mary-
land, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956); City of St.
Louis v. Evans, 337 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1960).
195. 387 U.S. at 536-37. In determining not to require the showing of probable cause,
the Court balanced society's interests in making the inspection against the individual's in-
terest in being safe from intrusion.
196. Id. at 539.
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could show a public interest, such as the protection of public
health and welfare, and attempt to obtain a warrant to screen
large groups of persons. 197 The reviewing judge or magistrate, fol-
lowing Camara, would use reasonableness as the ultimate
standard. 9
Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines
applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the
probable cause requirement in this area. It merely gives full
recognition to the competing public and private interests. . . at
stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind
the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable govern-
ment invasions of privacy.' 99
While the public interest in genetic screening is strong
enough °" to permit the issuance of a Camara-type warrant, it is
still an inconvenience for the government to seek such warrants.
Camara did recognize exceptions to the warrant rule: "[N]othing
we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even
without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emer-
gency situations." 0' In the past, such emergency searches and
seizures have been upheld in the following situations: the seizure
of tainted food;202 compulsory smallpox vaccinations;2 3 quaran-
tines for health purposes;2 4 and the killing of cattle with tubercu-
losis. 20 5 The health purposes behind genetic screening are
comparable to these types of cases. Although the need to detect
genetic disease presently may not connote the dangers of conta-
gious disease, arguably when genetic disease becomes more preva-
lent20 6 and its costs increase, 20 7 genetic screening will be viewed
similarly to smallpox vaccinations. The emergency situation then
may permit genetic screening absent a search warrant.
The Court also has allowed warrantless searches in other ar-
eas.208 The Court held, for example, in Wyman v. James,2 °9 that
197. Id. at 538-39. Individual warrants for each premise and dwelling unit were not
required. Id.
198. See id. at 539.
199. Id. (citing Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1960)).
200. See notes 24-35 supra and accompanying text.
201. 387 U.S. at 539.
202. See North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
203. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
204. Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
205. Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498 (1929).
206. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
207. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), where the Supreme Court
held that a warrantless inspection of a weapons dealer by a federal agent was legal, reason-
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home visits to recipients of Aid to Families With Dependent Chil-
dren funds did not require a search warrant.21 ° While the Court
said such visits were not searches in the traditional criminal law
context,211 it analyzed the visits as searches. 212 The factors ex-
amined by the Court included: 1) the purpose of the visit which
was to aid the government in benefitting the child receiving the
funds and not to attain criminal information; 2) the effectiveness
of the means used to accomplish this purpose and the availability
of alternative means; and 3) the severity of the intrusion.213 The
Court relied heavily on the fact that these visits, even if searches,
were not criminal in nature.214
Screening procedures may be viewed similarly to the Wyman
visits. The Wyman Court emphasized the importance of the pub-
lic interest being protected-the child's needs2I'5-and commented
that this purpose was unlike the purposes behind criminal
ing that tlRe dealer entered into a business subject to heavy federal licensing requirements
that lent itself to unannounced searches for effective inspection and enforcement. Id. at
316-17.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), the Court held that immi-
gration officials could conduct legal warrantless searches at borders. Id. at 272-73. In
Almeida-Sanchez, however, the search of defendant's car 25 miles from the Mexican bor-
der was held unconstitutional because there was no reason for the arresting officer to be-
lieve the defendant had crossed the border. Id. at 273.
When the situation entails the search of body cavities and requires the subject to un-
dress, customs inspectors must make a strong showing of probable cause for the search.
Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).
The constitutionality of airport searches has been upheld in courts and supported by
commentators. See generally United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); Abramovsky, The Constitutionality of the
Anti-Hfacking Security System, 22 BuFFALo L. REV. 123 (1972); Note, Airport Security
Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1039 (1971); Note,Airport Freight
and Passenger Searches: Application of Fourth Amendment Standards, 14 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 953 (1973).
209. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
210. Id. at 317-18.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 318.
213. Id. at 317-24. See also Note, The Constitutionality of Airport Searches, 72 MICH.
L. REV. 128, 143 (1973).
214. 400 U.S. at 317-18, 323, 325. The distinction between civil and criminal searches
has been made in another context. In discussing the constitutionality of a mandatory mass
screening program to detect those persons disposed to criminal behavior, one commentator
concluded such a search would be criminal and ultimately would be held unconstitutional,
but not necessarily on fourth amendment grounds. The author also contended that if the
screening program were classified as civil rather than criminal, it would withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny. Note, Guilt by Physiology: The Constitutionality of Tests to Determine Pre-
disposition to Violent Behavior, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 489, 507, 527 (1974).
215. 400 U.S. at 318.
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searches.21 6 The purposes behind genetic screening are also non-
criminal and are offered to protect the public's health and wel-
fare.21 7 Genetic screening procedures resemble the Wyman
welfare visits more than the Schmerber blood test 218 or the
Camara inspection219 since in the latter cases the searches were
conducted to discover criminal activity. 220 The Wyman Court
also emphasized the mildness of the intrusion posed by a welfare
visit.221 Similarly, a blood test is not overly burdensome. 2 1 Jus-
tice Brennan stated that a compelled blood test was a minor intru-
sion even though it was taken in a criminal context.223 Thus, a
compelled blood test in a civil context may present a lesser
intrusion.
Since genetic screening procedures fall in the civil context and
have as their purpose the protection of the public welfare, a court
may view the procedures similarly to the welfare visits in Wyman.
As such, warrantless screening would not constitute a violation of
the fourth amendment. Courts also could compare the screening
procedures to emergency situations, such as smallpox vaccina-
tions, thus allowing screening without a warrant.2 24 If a court re-
quired a warrant, a Camara-type warrant could be obtained.'
The fourth amendment prohibition against illegal searches and
seizures, therefore, will not render mandatory genetic screening
tests unconstitutional.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment-Substantive Due Process
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 226 pro-
216. See note 214 supra.
217. It is within a state's police power to establish reasonable regulations to protect the
health and safety of its citizenry. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); New Orleans Gas
Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 661 (1885); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465,
470-71 (1877).
218. See notes 177-80 supra and accompanying text.
219. See notes 188-99 supra and accompanying text.
220. The criminal activity in Schmerber was driving while intoxicated. The illegal ac-
tivity in Camara was the violation of a housing code regulation. See 400 U.S. at 324-25.
221. Id. at 320-22.
222. Some people may have religious beliefs that make the intrusion seem more severe.
See notes 343-49 infra and accompanying text.
223. 384 U.S. at 772. For Justice Brennan's quote, see text accompanying note 180
supra.
224. See notes 201-07 supra and accompanying text.
225. See notes 197-199 supra and accompanying text.
226. "No State shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .. " U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I.
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hibits state governmental227 deprivation of life, liberty, and prop-
erty, unless proper legal procedures are observed.228 When
focusing on the substantive content of life, liberty, or property, the
Court engaged in a substantive due process analysis at the begin-
ning of this century229 to strike down any economic regulation
that was not a fair and reasonable exercise of the states' police
power. 230 Although the Court no longer engages in such analysis
to scrutinize economic regulation,231 it still uses substantive due
process to protect certain noneconomic rights,232 such as the right
of privacy. 3? The cases in which the right of privacy has been
upheld are typically within the "sex-marriage-childbearing-
childrearing" areas." 4 Although the standard of judicial review
227. The fifth amendment protects persons from federal governmental interference.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
228. See Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv.
1157 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. "The doctrine that governmental depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property are subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the
procedures employed has come to be known as substantive due process." Id. at 1166. See
also Brown, Due Process af Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court, 40 HARv. L. REV.
943 (1927); Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of.American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV.
247 (1914).
229. This time in history often was called the Lochner era. See Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905); Developments, supra note 228, at 1166-67.
230. See, ag., William v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (state price controls
on gasoline struck down as a deprivation of property without due process); Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (law prescribing minimum wages for women struck down
as unconstitutional abridgement of freedom to contract); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590
(1917) (law prohibiting employment agencies from collecting fees from workers constituted
deprivation of property without due process).
231. See Developments, supra note 228, at 1167-68.
232. Id. During the Lochner era, the Court began "finding certain liberty guarantees
of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states by force of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment." Id. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
This process of incorporation (making the right applicable to the state through the four-
teenth amendment) has continued, and presently, some rights not explicitly contained in
the Bill of Rights are being incorporated. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Once a right is incorporated, heightened
judicial scrutiny is applied. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
For a discussion of the problems of incorporating fundamental values not contained in the
Bill of Rights, see Developments, supra note 228, at 1168-77.
233. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
234. See Ely, Forward- On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5, 11
(1978). Professor Ely notes, however, that what makes this composite a unitary area is
unclear. The diversity in the area is manifested by the cases. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (Court referred to the "private realm of family life" in up-
holding a restriction on maximum work hours for children); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (marriage and reproduction fundamental to existence of race and
basic civil rights of all individuals); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925)
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varies, 235 the Court always balances the state's interest in estab-
lishing a law against the impact of such law upon the constitu-
tional rights of those individuals challenging the law.23 6
As an intrusion becomes more destructive of a right, it may be
outweighed only by increasingly substantial state interests, and
the degree of fit demanded between means and ends will in-
crease as well ...
Even given a balancing approach, the Court's use of strict
scrutiny language in substantive due process cases might not be
wholly inappropriate. . . . That family rights, when their in-
fringement is at its apex, be outweighed only by compelling
state interests is consistent with the level of protection afforded
other substantive constitutional values protected under the due
237process clause of the fourteenth amendment ....
Since mandatory genetic screening and counseling may influ-
ence decisions of marriage and childbearing,238 the right of pri-
vacy becomes involved. Two attacks on genetic screening are
possible based on the right of privacy. First, counseling those in-
dividuals with positive results affects their decisions regarding the
protected areas of marriage and procreation.23 9 Second, the
screening procedure involves data collection and storage, the con-
fidentiality of which is protected by the right of privacy.240
1. The Right of Privacy and Its Impact on Mandatory
Counseling of Those Individuals with Positive
Screening Results
The right of privacy has been recognized implicitly for nearly
one hundred years.2 1 The Court and its individual justices have
(Oregon law requiring children to attend only public schools invalidated); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (liberty includes the right to marry and to have and rear
children).
235. See Developments, supra note 228, at 1195 (quoting Professor Ely: "In due process
analysis no threshold marks the passage from the most minimal to the most exacting
scrutiny.").
236. Id. at 1194-95.
237. Id. at 1195-96. In this Note, the most lenient judicial scrutiny will be referred to
as the "rational basis test." The most stringent scrutiny will be referred to as "strict
scrutiny."
238. See notes 70-79 supra and accompanying text.
239. Developments, supra note 228, at 1195-96. Since the right of privacy is most rele-
vant to the right to exercise personal autonomy in the areas of marriage and procreation,
the terms right to marry and right to reproduce or have children sometimes will be used.
240. Id.
241. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
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found the basis for the right of privacy in the firSt,2 4 2 fourth,
fifth,2 4 3 ninth,24 4 and fourteenth 245 amendments as well as in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights.2 46 Since the right of privacy in-
volves the right to marry and procreate, counseling carriers or
those persons afflicted with genetic disease against having children
may impinge on their right of privacy.247 The counseling foreseen
in this Note, however, would provide only genetic information to
facilitate intelligent decisionmaking concerning marriage and
reproduction. 48
While the additional information made available by genetic
counseling will enhance an individual's ability to make informed
decisions, there is concern that government-compelled screening
and counseling may lead to government-compelled abortion and
restrictions on childbearing.249 These concerns, in addition to the
questionable objectivity of genetic counseling,250 warrant a de-
tailed analysis of the possible infringements on an individual's
right of privacy.
The right to marry is not absolute. In 1914, for example, the
Wisconsin premarital blood test law requiring males about to be
married to undergo screening for venereal disease was chal-
lenged.25 t The challengers argued that the law restricted mar-
riage.' 2 The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that it was
242. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
243. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350
(1967).
244. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
245. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
246. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
247. See note 234 supra and accompanying text.
248. See notes 70-79 supra and accompanying text. See also Capron, supra note 32;
Note, supra note 29.
249. In fact, both of these alternatives are being recommended presently. See note 81
supra and accompanying text. Some individuals recommend the immediate adoption of
eugenics programs, even when there is only limited knowledge available. See Vukovich,
The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971
U. ILL. L.F. 189, 197. Other individuals recommend that coercive methods should be used
to insist that carriers of a disease ascertainable through amniocentesis not have affected
children. Murray, supra note 32.
An alternative, suggested by Nobel laureate Linus Pauling, is to screen everyone at
birth or during early childhood to detect their genetic defects. A small tatoo then should be
placed on the child identifying the genetic defects carried. When dating begins, young
people would be able to detect immediately whether or not their dating partner is compati-
ble genetically with them. Pauling, Reflections on the New Biology: Forward, 15 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 267, 269 (1968).
250. See notes 70-79 supra and accompanying text.
251. Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N.W. 966 (1914).
252. The plaintiffs also challenged the cost of the test most often used and questioned
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undeniably within the state's police power to control and regulate
marriage through reasonable laws. Since this statute was reason-
able, it did not violate due process.253 Most states currently re-
quire premarital testing for venereal disease, and, in most of these
states, positive results prevent issuance of a marriage license.
Other restrictions on marriage include age limits, consanguinity
laws,254 and statutes forbidding drunkards and imbeciles from
marrying. 5 These limits placed on marriage and procreation
have withstood constitutional challenge.
Not all restrictions on marriage and procreation have been up-
held. In Griswold v. Connecticut,256 for example, the Court struck
down a statute forbidding the use of contraceptives and forbid-
ding any person from aiding, counseling, or causing someone to
use contraceptives.2 57 The majority in Griswold recognized that
various constitutional guarantees gave rise to a zone of privacy 258
and that the use of contraceptives by married persons fell within
that zone. 259 The Court did not classify the right of privacy as
fundamental but indicated that the right should be reviewed by
utilizing a standard stricter than the rational basis test.26°
whether the legislature intended that only one test be used. Id. at 641, 651-55, 147 N.W. at
966, 969-71.
253. Id. at 656-57, 147 N.W. at 971. The challengers also argued that the law violated
equal protection by singling out men about to marry and not women. While recognizing
the validity of this argument, the court nevertheless rejected it because women were not
contracting venereal disease and giving it to men. The court noted that both common
knowledge and statistics showed that a great number of women who married were pure
and in no need of a premarital blood test. Id. at 648-49, 147 N.W. at 968.
254. See P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 135-36. In New York, there is a statute requiring
that an SCA test be given to marriage license applicants who are not Caucasian, Indian, or
Oriental. The results are to be given to the applicant and "no application for a marriage
license shall be denied solely on the ground that the test proves positive nor shall the ab-
sence of such test invalidate a marriage." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 13-aa (McKinney 1977).
255. An Ohio statute provides, for example, that "no marriage license shall be granted
when either of the applicants is a habitual drunkard, imbecile, or insane person, is under
the influence of an intoxicating liquor or controlled substance, or is infected with syphilis in
a form that is communicable or likely to become communicable." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3101.06 (Page 1980).
256. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
257. Id. at 485.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Note, The Right to Privacy Expanded, State Infringements Upon Decisions Af-
fecting Contraception Subjectedto Strict Scrutiny, 24 LoY. L. REv. 149, 152 (1978). See also
Developments, supra note 228, at 1196.
In Griswold, Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion indicated that a compelling state
interest (strict scrutiny) test was being used. 381 U.S. at 497-98.
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In Eisenstadt v. Baird,26 1 the Court restated its Griswold hold-
ing as follows:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question in-
hered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not
an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.262
This reading of Griswold, though dicta, has become the accepted
interpretation.263
After Griswold, the Supreme Court came "naturally" to the
next question involving the right to choose to bear or beget a
child-whether such a right also included the right to abort. 6  In
Roe v. Wade,265 the Court held that although the right to abort
was not absolute, the right to bear a child did include the right to
abort.266 At a certain point, the state's interest in the health of the
mother and fetus attains sufficient importance to override the wo-
man's choice to abort.267 The Roe Court spoke in terms of com-
pelling state interests and fundamental rights, indicating that for
at least three months, the right of privacy included the right to
abort.26
8
Such substantive due process decisions indicate that right of
privacy challenges will receive heightened judicial scrutiny. This
level of scrutiny does not mean, however, that statutes restricting
the right of privacy automatically will be struck down as unconsti-
tutional.26 9 In each case, the Court will employ a balancing
261. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
262. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
263. See Developments, supra note 228, at 1185. See also Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Forward" In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a
Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 34-36 (1972). The standard of review used in
Eisenstad was stricter than the rational basis standard.
264. Developments, supra note 228, at 1185.
265. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). "This right of privacy... is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
266. Id. at 154. The Court acknowledged that it was not clear whether the right of
privacy explicated in Roe included the rights of personal autonomy--"an unlimited right
to do with one's body as one pleases' Id.
267. Id. at 154, 162-63.
268. Id. The Court thought that the state's interest in the health of the mother became
compelling after the first three months of pregnancy. Id. at 163.
269. "Whatever the truth of the maxim that strict scrutiny is strict in theory but fatal in
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test.270 The purpose behind genetic screening statutes and their
requirements for counseling those individuals with positive results
will be weighed against the infringement on the right of privacy.
If the counseling is objective and only given for informational
value, the governmental interests in screening outweigh the inva-
sion of the right of privacy, just as the governmental interests in
the health of the expectant mother and her fetus outweigh the
mother's right to terminate a pregnancy once it has advanced to a
certain point.27'
If genetic counseling becomes slanted toward urging persons
to abort, not to reproduce, or not to reproduce with a certain part-
ner, then the invasion of privacy would be more severe. If, how-
ever, there are no forced abortions, sterilizations, or other
restrictions on childbearing, the state interest in protecting the
public from genetic disease and its future implications is strong
enough to allow such pointed counseling. Those persons chal-
lenging mandatory genetic counseling statutes must show that the
right to make procreative decisions is so fundamental that no
compelling interest of the state could justify the counseling.272
Testing alone will not achieve the purposes behind genetic
screening-reducing the genetic load and reducing costs of genetic
disease.273 Genetic screening and counseling of those individuals
with positive results, however, will provide those people with ad-
ded knowledge to aid in the decision whether to have children.
To reduce the genetic load and costs, many adults will have to
forego having children or terminate some pregnancies. The ulti-
mate decision, however, remains with the individual. The choices
to forego having children or to seek an abortion may be personal
decisions, but these choices should be made with the knowledge of
one's genetic makeup. If courts view genetic screening as a
method of enhancing informed decisionmaking, screening legisla-
tion should survive the challenge that it deprives a person of free
fact in the equal protection analysis of laws affecting suspect classes, it is misleading in a
substantive due process analysis." Developments, supra note 228, at 1196.
270. See text accompanying note 237 supra.
271. See note 267 supra and accompanying text.
272. The Court has upheld laws which arguably infringed on a personal autonomy
right--the right to do with one's body as one chooses. It is arguable that a person's right to
choose what to do with his or her body should have been sufficient to invalidate such laws.
See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), a f'dmem., 425
U.S. 901 (1976), rehearing denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976) (law against homosexuality between
consenting adults upheld).
273. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
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choice in the areas of marriage and childbearing. The Supreme
Court has stated that "freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."274 A mecha-
nism to assist a person in making a more intelligent, thought-
ful, and informed choice certainly should not be held
unconstitutional.
2. The Right of Privacy and Its Impact on the Collection and
Storage of Screening Test Results
An additional challenge based on the right of privacy is that
information obtained through genetic screening, and subsequently
stored, invades a constitutionally protected zone of privacy.275 In
Whalen v. Roe, 6 the Court confronted a case involving govern-
ment storage of personal information. 77 Justice Stevens, in his
majority opinion, recognized two types of privacy: "One is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and
another is the interest in independence and in making certain
kinds of important decisions. 278 Justice Stevens found no viola-
tion of either type of privacy.27 9 Safeguards against improvident
disclosure accompanied the gathering of personal information,280
and the statute did not infringe on an individual's right to make
274. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
275. In half of the states, the screening statutes mandate that health authorities gather
data on persons with positive screening results. In some states, that data is gathered indi-
rectly. In North Carolina, for example, hemophiliacs receive a special tax deduction. See
Riskin & Reilly, Remediesfor Improper Disclosure of Genetic Data, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 480,
483-86 (1977).
276. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
277. In Whalen, names and addresses of all patients who had obtained prescriptions for
certain dangerous but legal drugs and the names of the prescribing physician and dispens-
ing pharmacy were stored in computers. Physicians and their patients sued, alleging that
the statute authorizing this information storage infringed their rights of privacy. The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's finding that the statute infringed the plaintiffs'
rights of privacy. Id.
278. Id. at 599-600.
279. Id. at 600.
280. The Court noted the following safeguards: the computer tapes were destroyed
after five years; the receiving room for reporting forms was surrounded by a locked wire
fence and alarm systems; the computer tapes were kept in locked cabinets; and the com-
puter was run on an exclusive access to all other terminals when the tapes were being run.
Id. at 593-94. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan voiced concern that "It]he central
storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse
of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not demon-
strate the necessity of some curb on such technology." Id. at 607.
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his or her own decisions. 28' The evidence in the case showed no
violation of the disclosure requirements, and the Court noted that
the remote chance of negligent disclosure was not enough to inval-
idate the statute.282 Thus, under Whalen, an attack based on the
confidentiality strand of the right of privacy should fail if the
screening statute contains provisions for the careful storage of test
results.2 83
C. The Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee of Equal Protection of
the Laws
Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees persons equal protection of the laws, 84 the
clause does not prohibit the government from drawing distinctions
between individuals.285 Indeed, government must make differen-
tiations.286 In recognition of the daily needs of governance, the
Court scrutinizes most laws making such distinctions under the
rational basis test and generally upholds the law, since all that
must be shown is a rational relationship between the classification
and the legitimate interest of the state in having such a law.287
Not all governmental classifications, however, receive the benefit
of the rational basis test. To protect "discrete and insular minori-
ties" 288 that have been "saddled with disabilities or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command ex-
traordinary protection from the majoritarian political process, 289
the courts use a strict scrutiny standard of review. 290 Thus far, the
only categories labelled as "suspect classifications" are race2 9' and
national origin.29 2
28 1. Id. at 600-04.
282. Id. at 600-01.
283. See notes 387-90 infra and accompanying text.
284. "No state shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "The federal government is subject to a simi-
lar imperative under the due process clause of the fifth amendment." Developments, supra
note 228, at 1187. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
285. See Developments, supra note 228, at 1187-88.
286. Government, for example, must decide who to draft, who is to receive welfare,
and how old a person must be to drive, vote, drink, or marry.
287. See Developments, supra note 228, at 1188.
288. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
289. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). See
Developments, supra note 228, at 1189.
290. See Developments, supra note 228, at 1189.
291. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
292. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, the Court sub-
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The strict scrutiny standard of review also is used if the gov-
ernment classification infringes on a fundamental right.2 93 "[T]he
fundamental rights branch of equal protection will be available
only to protect rights that are otherwise substantively protected by
the Constitution, including newly recognized substantive due pro-
cess rights." 294
An equal protection challenge to a mandatory genetic screen-
ing statute would focus on the mandatory counseling of those in-
dividuals with positive test results. Although all persons would be
screened mandatorily, only those individuals with positive screen-
ing results would receive counseling. 95 Thus, screening laws may
be attacked for treating persons with positive results differently
than those persons with negative results.
1. Equal Protection-The Suspect Class Strand
A successful suspect class challenge requires either a showing
that persons testing positive would constitute a suspect class 2 96 or
that there is no rational relationship between the classification of
those individuals with positive results and the purposes behind ge-
netic screening laws.297 If those individuals with positive results
could show that they are a suspect class, they would receive the
benefit of a strict scrutiny standard of review.z 8 Since those indi-
viduals with positive results, however, are not a race or a national-
ity,299 they would not fall within the present definition of a suspect
class.
jected an order issued by the United States Army excluding Japanese-Americans from cer-
tain sensitive areas on the West Coast during World War II to "the most rigid scrutiny"
Id. at 216. The order survived strict scrutiny due to the exigencies of the war.
293. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Shapiro v. Thomas, 394 U.S.
618, 638 (1969); Developments, supra note 228, at 1192-93.
294. Developments, supra note 228, at 1193. See 434 U.S. at 383-87. For a more de-
tailed discussion of Zablocki, see notes 314-22 infra and accompanying text.
295. See notes 384-86 infra and accompanying text. Under the model statute, everyone.
is educated about genetics and reproduction and counseled before the screening. The posi-
tive group, therefore, is not the only group to undergo genetic counseling. Those individu-
als with positive results, however, may need more counseling to help them make informed
decisions. One way to avoid the equal protection attack altogether is to have only prescree-
ning counseling. This remedy would be less effective since the particular genetic defect
would-he unknown. Under this approach, everyone, regardless of defect, would receive
general information on genetics instead of individual counseling on their particular genetic
problem.
296. See notes 288-92 supra and accompanying text.
297. See note 287 supra and accompanying text.
298. See notes 288-92 supra and accompanying text.
299. See notes 291-92 supra and accompanying text.
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Recently the Court has shown a tendency to depart from its
rigid two tier system of analysis in the equal protection area.300
For example, a gender-based classification, although not a suspect
class, has been subjected to scrutiny more strict than the rational
basis test and less rigid than a strict scrutiny analysis.30' If those
individuals with positive screening results could convince the
courts that they deserve heightened scrutiny, their equal protec-
tion challenge would have a greater chance of success. If their
challenge were relegated to the rational basis standard, those indi-
viduals with positive results would have difficulty showing that no
rational connection exists between positive screening results and
future counseling to help interpret those results, particularly if the
purpose of such counseling is merely to inform those individuals
with positive results of their particular defect and its effects. 3 2
Since everyone eventually is apprised of genetic information and
education,30 3 those individuals with positive results cannot argue
that they alone receive genetic counseling. Moreover, the govern-
ment may argue that there is a rational relationship between post-
test counseling and the classification of those individuals with pos-
itive results, since the purpose of counseling is to protect the
health and welfare of those persons with positive results by in-
forming them of the severity and effects of their genetic disease.
For those with negative results, the prescreening counseling is suf-
ficient protection.
The best counter argument which can be made to gain a
heightened standard of review is that those individuals of a certain
race are found more frequently among the positive group. This
argument would be excellent if only persons of certain races with
positive results received counseling. When everyone with positive
results receives counseling, however, it is difficult to argue that the
classification is based on the suspect class of race.3°4 Those indi-
viduals against screening could argue that an unusually large
300. The two tier system under an equal protection analysis refers to the Court's use of
a rational basis test or a strict scrutiny test with no intermediate standard of review. See
notes 287-94 supra and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also Developments, supra note
228, at 1190-92.
302. Under the rational basis test, prenatal screening probably-would withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny. A woman with positive screening results for Tay-Sachs, for example, will
probably require future counseling to aid in her decision of whether to abort.
303. See notes 384-86 infra and accompanying text.
304. Persons with positive test results would be counseled as a class. The class would
consist of all races and both sexes since there are screening devices to detect genetic disease
in all persons.
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number of Blacks, Orientals, or some other race typically discrim-
inated against were present in the positive results group. This ar-
gument might lead to heightened scrutiny of the purposes behind
counseling and classification of those persons with positive results.
If the available genetic disease testing procedures detected a dis-
proportionate number of diseases in one race, heightened scrutiny
might be appropriate. 05 Available screening tests, however, prob-
ably will not demonstrate such disproportionate results.
It is difficult to argue that classification is based on race when
all persons with positive results receive counseling. Genetic dis-
ease occurs in everyone regardless of race.30 6 Screening devices
discover the defective gene even when it is not manifested. Good
health, diet, medical care, and education may prevent a genetic
disease from having serious effects in some individuals, while poor
health, diet, medical care, and education may lead to more grave
consequences in the manifestation of genetic disease.30 7 Genetic
screening, however, pierces such social and economic factors. In
this manner, genetic screening procedures are not discriminatory.
Hence, if the available genetic screening procedures do not detect
a disproportionate number of diseases in one race, heightened
scrutiny will not be available, and the screening laws will survive
constitutional attack under the rational basis test.
2. Equal Protection-The Fundamental Rights Strand
A successful challenge against genetic screening statutes on the
basis that the classification of those individuals with positive re-
sults infringes on a fundamental right, requires a showing that the
rights to marry and reproduce are fundamental, thus mandating
the strict scrutiny test. In support of this argument, the challeng-
ers could cite Skinner v. Oklahoma,08 in which the Court, using a
strict scrutiny standard of review, 3 9 invalidated Oklahoma's Ha-
bitual Criminal Sterilization Act which provided for the steriliza-
305. If it could be shown, for example, that 1,000 genetic diseases were detectable
through screening and that 400 were peculiar to Blacks, heightened scrutiny would be nec-
essary. If, in contrast, only 20 of the diseases were peculiar to Blacks and the other diseases
detectable were not disproportionately peculiar to any one group, heightened scrutiny
would not be necessary. If, however, the 20 diseases peculiar to Blacks represented 250,000
out of 350,000 with positive results, heightened scrutiny again would be a possibility.
306. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
307. See Vukovich, supra note 249, at 196-97.
308. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
309. Id. at 541.
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tion of certain criminals. °10 The Court viewed the rights of
"[m]arriage and procreation . . . fundamental to the very exist-
ence and survival of the race."'31 - To deprive persons of these
rights was tantamount to the deprivation of the "basic civil rights
of men." '312 The Court concluded that the importance of these
rights was sufficient to override the great deference afforded a
state in the exercise of its police power. 3
In Zablocki v. Redhail,31 4 the Supreme Court struck down a
Wisconsin law prohibiting certain Wisconsin residents from mar-
rying without court permission. The class of residents included
any "Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody
and which he is under obligation to support by any court order or
judgment. '31 5 Court approval was available upon a showing that
the applicant was meeting his support obligations and that "the
children covered by the support order [were] not then and [were]
not likely thereafter to become public charges. 3 16 Justice Mar-
shall, in the majority opinion, described the standard of review:
"Since our past decisions make clear that the right to marry is of
fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here
significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe
that 'critical examination' of the state interests advanced in sup-
port of the classification is required. '317
Although Justice Marshall appeared to regard marriage as a
fundamental right, he later clarified his position:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry,
we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which
310. Id. at 541-42. The Act was invalidated on equal protection grounds because it
made exceptions for certain types of criminals. An embezzler convicted three times, for
instance, was not sterilized while those persons convicted three times of grand larceny were
sterilized. Id. at 541. In fact, Skinner's three offenses consisted of one conviction for steal-
ing chickens and two convictions for armed robbery. Id. at 537. The Court also spoke of
fundamental and basic liberties, language and ideas typical of a substantive due process
case. Id. at 541.
311. Id. at 541.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
315. Id. at 375.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 383. The state asserted two purposes for the statute: To give the state the
opportunity to counsel the applicant regarding his duty to support the children, and to
protect the welfare of children receiving support benefits. The Court accepted the two
interests as valid, but "since the means selected by the State for achieving these interests
unnecessarily impinge[d] on the right to marry, the statute [could not] be sustained." Id. at
388.
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relates in any way to the incidents or prerequisites for marriage
must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, rea-
sonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with deci-
sions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be
imposed.318
In Zablocki, the Court spoke in terms of equal protection,319
but the Justices differed on the appropriate level of scrutiny to be
applied-a common characteristic of substantive due process
cases utilizing a balancing approach instead of the typical two tier
analysis of equal protection review.320 Justice Stewart, for exam-
ple, advocated a case-by-case approach which would move from
the two tier approach toward a balancing approach.32' Justice
Marshall also recommended a move toward balancing.322
When a right is held to be fundamental, strict scrutiny will be
applied under the two tier system, and it will be difficult to uphold
the challenged law.323
Since the meaning of most rights is not unequivocal and "right"
is a general term encompassing a broad range of protected in-
terests, there is a danger that holding a right to be fundamental
will overvalue some interests. If this happens, legislatures may
be proscribed from acting where they would ordinarily be
found justified to act.324
Marriage and procreation are both fundamental rights; however,
this declaration does not mean that all restrictions which are
placed upon them will be subjected automatically to strict
318. Id. at 386. But see Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624,
667-73 (1980) (every outright restriction on marriage must survive strict scrutiny).
319. See Developments, supra note 228, at 1197.
320. In practice, the "flexible balancing" thought appropriate in substantive due
process cases will most likely occur both in decisions explicitly cast in substantive
due process terms and in those formulated under the rubric of equal protection.
The concurrences in Redhaii suggest that the protection of an individual liberty
may be more complicated than the protection of the more general right not to be
classified on the basis of certain characteristics.
Id.
321. 434 U.S. at 396. Justice Stewart said the proper concerns in an equal protection
inquiry include:
the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the
rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, the existence
of alternative means for effectuating the purpose, and the degree of confidence we
may have that the statute reflects the legislative concern for the purpose that
would legitimately support the means chosen.
Id. at 396. Stewart, concurring in the judgment, cited Justice Harlan's concurrence in Wil-
liams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) for support.
322. See text accompanying note 318 supra.
323. See Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 479,
503 (1973).
324. Id.
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scrutiny. 325
Those individuals attacking screening laws under the funda-
mental rights strand must show that counseling of those persons
with positive results does restrict marriage or reproduction. If the
counseling is purely informative, the only restrictions are those
which individuals choose to place on themselves. This "freedom
of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. '326
If counseling is directed toward abortion, sterilization, or dis-
couraging certain people from having children, the argument may
arise that such directive counseling is a restriction on marriage
and procreation. The challenge then could be made that those
fundamental rights were infringed by the screening laws. The
government could support the validity of the law and its counsel-
ing provisions for those individuals with positive results by assert-
ing that the counseling sessions were "reasonable regulations that
[did] not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the
marital relationship. 3 27
Arguably, counseling sessions do not impose significant re-
strictions on marriage or reproduction. People are not prohibited
from marriage or procreation. In fact, marriage is not the issue
since genetic disease is not spread through marriage. Only repro-
duction increases the genetic load and genetic disease. Counsel-
ing, even if directive due to a counselor's personal feelings,3 28 does
not restrict reproduction. Perhaps counseling will initiate careful
consideration of natural reproduction and its alternatives, but to
date, counseling does not produce forced abortion or sterilization.
Those individuals testing positive merely receive counseling con-
cerning the implications of such results. Even if a counselor sug-
gests abortion or sterilization, the ultimate decision remains with
the individual.
If screening statutes require objective counseling, the statute
should withstand constitutional scrutiny because there has been
no infringement of a fundamental right. Conversely, statutes ad-
vocating highly directive counseling may violate the fundamental
right to freedom of choice. In such a case, the analysis would fo-
325. See text accompanying note 318 supra. See also Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 49
(1977).
326. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
327. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 386.
328. See notes 72-79 & 173-74 supra and accompanying text.
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cus on whether the state had a sufficiently important reason to
require the counseling, and whether the counseling was closely
tailored to effectuate only the governmental interest.329 Even
under this analysis, if there are no forced abortions or steriliza-
tions, directive counseling may not pose a sufficient restriction on
the right of reproduction to mandate invalidation of the statute.
This result will be particularly likely if the Court moves closer to a
balancing test in this area.330 After balancing the various interests
and restrictions, even directive counseling may withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny.
D. Attack Under the First Amendment-The Guarantee of
Freedom of Religion
The first amendment guarantees an individual the freedom to
exercise religious beliefs.33' This guarantee is applicable to the
states under the fourteenth amendment.332 Traditionally, "reli-
gious freedom in [America has occupied] a 'preferred position' as
a legal right, but is by no means absolute. '333 In Sherbert v. Ver-
ner,334 however, the Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review, which required a showing of a compelling state
interest:335  "It is basic that no showing merely of a rational rela-
tionship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this high-
ly sensitive constitutional area, '[oinly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation. 336 In addition, the Court recognized that the freedom
of religion was not absolute: "[E]ven when [an] action is in accord
with one's religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from legisla-
329. 434 U.S. at 388.
330. Many individuals think the Court already has moved to this balancing approach
or should move in that direction. See Goodpaster, supra note 323, at 503-06; Develop-
ments, supra note 228, at 1187-97; Note, Equal Protection and Due Process: Contrasting
Methods of Review Under Fourteenth Amendment Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
529, 561-65 (1979).
331. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof... "' U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, § 1.
332. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). See also Riga, Compulsory
Medical Treatment ofAdults, 22 CATH. LAw. 105, 106 n.4 (1976).
333. Riga, supra note 332, at 106. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
334. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
335. In Sherbert, the overturned law denied a Seventh-Day Adventist unemployment
compensation benefits because she would not work on Saturday due to religious beliefs.
Id. at 406.
336. Id. (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
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tive restrictions." 337
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,338 a freedom of religion attack
was brought against mandatory smallpox vaccinations. The
plaintiff contended that mandatory vaccinations infringed on his
fourteenth amendment rights.33 9 In response, the Court stated:
[I]n every well-ordered society charged with the duty of con-
serving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in
respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great
dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by rea-
sonable regulations, as the safety of the general public maydemand. 3 4 °
The Court viewed the statute as reasonably related to a valid state
interest and thus a proper exercise of the state's police power.34'
Although Jacobson did not concern a religious objection to the
vaccinations specifically, it did concern the defendant's belief that
it is the "inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body
and health in such way as to him seems best. .. .
In Sadlock v. Board of Education,343 the Court specifically
dealt with the freedom of religion attack. The plaintiff argued
that the statute requiring vaccination for school admittance de-
nied schooling to some individuals because of their religious be-
liefs.3 4 The Court replied that the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom was not intended to be absolute. Such a right
was only relative and must be viewed in terms of the public well-
being: "The principle is too well-established to require citation
that the so-called constitutional liberties are not absolute, but are
relative only. They must be considered in the light of the general
public welfare. To hold otherwise would be to place the individ-
337. 374 U.S. at 403 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)).
338. 197 U.S. I1 (1905).
339. Id. at 14.
340. Id. at 29.
341. Id. at 31, 35. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its Jacobson holding in Zucht v.
King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922). Other courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead. In State
v. Drew, 89 N.H. 54, 192 A. 629 (1937), the court stated: "If all men were to take the
position that individual opinions are equivalent to rights, law would be replaced by anar-
chy." Id. at 57, 192 A. at 632.
342. 197 U.S. at 26.
343. 137 N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948). The statute under attack allowed the board of
education to exclude any teacher or pupil who had not received a successful smallpox
vaccination, unless they were ruled medically unfit to receive the vaccination.
344. Id. at 86-87, 58 A.2d at 219-20. Religions such as Christian Scientists and Jeho-
vah's Witnesses do not believe in injections, blood transfusions and withdrawals, or medi-
cal treatment.
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ual above the law."345
Genetic screening statutes could be attacked at the level of the
procedure itself since there are religions which do not believe in
medical treatment.346 Common screening devices such as blood
tests and amniocentesis are medical procedures to which some re-
ligions may object.347 For a screening law to survive attack under
the freedom of religion doctrine, it must be shown that the govern-
ment has a substantial public interest sufficient to override the in-
dividual's freedom to exercise religious beliefs. 48 The present
attitude toward genetic disease may not be sufficient to force
screening upon those individuals who do not believe in medical
treatment and procedures. As information concerning the in-
crease in the genetic load becomes widespread, however, the need
to screen everyone, regardless of religious beliefs, will become
more apparent. If smallpox again reached epidemic proportions,
there is little doubt, in light of past case holdings,349 that the law
would require all persons to receive vaccinations. When genetic
disease becomes widespread or even when many believe that ge-
netic disease will become widespread, the courts may show an in-
creased propensity toward upholding mandatory genetic screening
laws.
The attack on genetic screening under the freedom of religion
doctrine is comparable to similar attacks brought against compul-
sory medical treatment. 350 The courts have become more liberal
in their use of parens patriae3 15 to order treatment for both chil-
dren and adults. In Cude v. State,352 an Arkansas court appointed
345. Id. at 91, 58 A.2d at 222. The Court in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878), held that a statute prohibiting polygamy was constitutional as applied to all per-
sons, regardless of their religious belief.
346. See note 344 supra.
347. Freedom of religion presently is recognized in many state screening statutes
through an exemption from the test for religious reasons. See note 90 supra.
348. A religious cult that believed in murder certainly would not be permitted to kill.
The overriding governmental interest in the public safety and welfare would be sufficient to
uphold the murder laws.
349. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Sadlock v. Board of Educ., 137
N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948).
350. See generally Riga, supra note 332.
351. The power of the state to appoint a guardian and to order medical treatment or
some other form of aid is known as parens patriae. For a recent summary of the area, see
Developments, supra note 228, at 1221-42. See generally Note, Compulsory Medical Treat-
ment: The Stater Interest Re-evaluated, 51 MINN. L. REv. 293, 298-301 (1966); Note,
The Right to Die---A Comment on the Application of the President and Directors of
Georgetown College, 9 UTAH L. REV. 161 (1964).
352. 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964).
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a guardian for three siblings whose ages ranged between seven
and fifteen and ordered the guardian to have the children vacci-
nated against smallpox when the natural parents refused the vac-
cinations on religious grounds. 3  The state statute in question
required children to have smallpox vaccinations before entering
school. Another state law required parents to send their children
to school.3 5 4 By not obeying the vaccination statute, the parents
also violated the mandatory school entrance law. The court stated
that parents could not deny an education for their children be-
cause their religious beliefs did not permit a vaccination. The
constitutional grant of religious freedom was not sufficient to al-
low these parents to behave in a manner inconsistent with the
health, safety, and welfare of others. The children, therefore, were
vaccinated. 5
Recently, some courts have extended the parens patriae doc-
trine. In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Ander-
son,3 56 a pregnant woman, of the Jehovah's Witness religion,
refused a blood transfusion on religious grounds. The woman's
condition made it likely that without a transfusion she would
place both her own life and that of her fetus in grave danger.35 7
The New Jersey court had no difficulty in ordering the transfusion
to save the fetus but faced a tougher issue in ordering a transfu-
sion for the mother. The court held, however, that the lives of the
mother and fetus were so intertwined that the transfusion was
justified. 8
Judge Skelley Wright extended the doctrine of parens patriae
further in Application of President and Directors of Georgetown
College, Inc. 359 Again, a husband and wife, both Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, refused to consent to a lifesaving blood transfusion for the
wife.360 The couple had a seven month old child. Judge Wright
immediately visited the couple in the hospital. Determining both
353. The court stated that if the natural parents did not take back the children, the
children would be placed for adoption. Id. at 930, 377 S.W.2d at 817-18.
354. Id. at 931, 377 S.W.2d at 818.
355. Id. at 936, 377 S.W.2d at 818-19.
356. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
357. Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
358. The court ordered the transfusion by remanding the matter to the trial court with
instructions to appoint a guardian for the fetus and substitute the guardian for the hospital
as plaintiff. Under this arrangement, the guardian could consent to the transfusion, the
mother could be directed to have the transfusion, and the woman's husband could be re-
strained from interfering. Id., 201 A.2d at 538.
359. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
360. The wife had suffered a ruptured ulcer and had lost two-thirds of her blood sup-
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that the woman could not decide for herself at the time and that
she wanted to live, Judge Wright ordered the transfusion.36'
Judge Wright reasoned that the state had an interest in preserving
the mother's life so that she could continue her "community re-
sponsibility" of caring for her child.362
Courts have appointed guardians to order medical treatment
for children needing blood transfusions363 and for those children
suffering from arthritic symptoms, 364 eye disease,365 and limb de-
formity.366 Courts, however, often will refuse to order dangerous
or risky medical treatment.367  The courts' willingness to extend
the parens patriae doctrine to adults shows a change in the judicial
attitude toward the freedom to exercise religion. Although such
decisions are not without their critics,368 the rulings do show a
willingness by some courts to balance the competing interests of
the adult's right to refuse medical treatment against the state's de-
sire to treat the adult.
As genetic disease becomes more prevalent, the courts may be
willing to use the parens patriae power to demand screening for
children whose parents have refused such screening on religious
ply. Id. at 1006. With the transfusion, her chance of survival was over 50%, but without it,
she would die. Id. at 1007.
361. Judge Wright ordered the transfusion and requested immediate review so that a
precedent would not be set without full court review. Judge Wright said: "To refuse to act,
only to find later that the law required action, was a risk I was unwilling to accept. I
determined to act on the side of life." Id. at 1010.
362. Id. at 1008. The D.C. Circuit later refused to rehear the case en banc. The mother
already had left the hospital, and the order for the transfusion had expired. President and
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
363. See, e.g., Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
364. See, eg., Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (rex. Civ. App. 1947) (child given
prayers and home remedies for treatment because mother believed in divine healing).
365. See, eg., In re Vasco, 238 App. Div. 2d 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933) (child had eye
condition that probably would lead to a malignancy and eventual death, and the surgery
for the disorder had a 50% cure rate).
366. See, ag., In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941)
(stigma associated with the deformity was enough to cause the child psychological harm).
,But see In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 632, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (guardian not appointed to 12
year old child whose left arm was almost as large as her body even though the large arm
was causing both physical and emotional harm).
367. Compare Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (court has power
to declare child afflicted with life-threatening disease dependent on state) with In re Hud-
son, 13 Wash. 2d 632, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (court without authority to deprive parent cus-
tody and control of child).
368. See Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's Interest Re-evaluated, supra
note 351, at 298-301; Note, The Right to Die-4 Comment on the Application of the Presi-
dent and Directors of Georgetown College, supra note 351.
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grounds.369 Again, the courts' reactions to religious objections
against screening will depend on the prevalence of genetic disease
and the extent to which medical science can demonstrate the fu-
ture implications of an increasing genetic load.370 The greater the
understanding of these future implications, the more likely that
religious objections will not prevent a mandatory genetic screen-
ing program.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR BETTER GENETIC SCREENING
LEGISLATION
Although both the Maryland screening statute371 and the 1978
Genetic Diseases Act 372 manifest strides forward in genetic
screening legislation, problems still remain with screening stat-
utes. The incidence of genetic screening certainly will continue to
increase,373 thus mandating careful consideration of screening leg-
islation. This increase requires a "conscious, deliberate formula-
tion of public policy with respect to genetic technology.1374 It has
been suggested that a carefully drafted compulsory premarital
screening law, which would apply to all citizens, would survive
judicial scrutiny:
As long as the law provided for competent screening services,
high quality genetic counseling for persons with positive test
results, public education, and confidentiality of test data and
did not require any action on the basis of test results, it would
be approved. Similarly, preschool testing that made provision
for data storage and a subsequent counseling session would be
legally acceptable.375
In view of the potential constitutional challenges 376 to such a stat-
ute, it is necessary to define guidelines for developing genetic
screening legislation which will leave open fewer avenues of con-
stitutional attack.
369. Just as courts have ordered smallpox vaccinations and have used parens patriae to
affect such an order, courts may do the same regarding a genetic screening test. See notes
352-55 supra and accompanying text.
370. See text accompanying note 349 supra.
371. See notes 127-44 supra and accompanying text.
372. See notes 145-68 supra and accompanying text.
373. See Riskin & Reilly, supra note 275, at 484-86.
374. Green, Law and Genetic Controk Public Policy Questions, in ETHICAL AND SCIEN-
TIFIC ISSUES POSED BY HUMAN UsES OF MOLECULAR GENETICS 171 (M. Lapp6 & R.
Morison eds. 1976).
375. P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 147 (emphasis supplied).
376. See notes 169-370 supra and accompanying text.
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A. Guidelines
A screening program should define carefully the group(s) it
seeks to affect.377 This goal does not require that a statute be writ-
ten for each particular group to be screened. The statute, how-
ever, should be written carefully, assuring inclusion of the
necessary groups in a nondiscriminatory way.
Screening legislation should strive to ensure the highest quali-
ty of laboratory work.378 The inaccuracy of the PKU and
SCA screening tests caused many problems.379  To avoid such
problems, statutes should require special training for laboratory
technicians, establish special laboratories, and allocate funds for
further research. Such precautions also would aid in attaining the
lowest level of inaccurate results.380
The legislation should include provisions for both evaluation
of the procedures and medical followup on the persons
screened.381 Since the future effects of screening procedures are
unknown, followups would be helpful in ascertaining both the
physical3 82 and the psychological 38 3 long term effects of screening
377. See Powledge & Fletcher, Guidelines for the Ethical, Social and Legal Issues in
Prenatal Diagnosis, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 168, 169 (1979). This article exclusively con-
cerns prenatal screening, but many of its ideas for better legislation are relevant to all types
of screening.
378. Id.
379. See notes 83-126 supra and accompanying text.
380. Prenatal diagnosis presents special problems concerning false negative and false
positive results. A false negative result indicates a negative result when in truth it should
be positive. A false negative result indicates an affected fetus is healthy. This result can
lead to the birth of an undesired, affected child. Another example is found in adult screen-
ing when a carrier of a genetic disease is told that he or she does not carry the disease. This
result leads to a false sense of security and may lead to the birth of an affected child.
False positive results indicate a positive result when actually the result is negative.
Prenatally, a false positive result indicates that the fetus is affected when, in fact, it is
healthy. This result can lead to abortion of a healthy fetus. In adults, a person is told
erroneously that he or she is a carrier of a disease. This result can affect an adult's decision
to marry and have children. Most screening tests are performed only once. Further test
results, therefore, are not available to correct the initial misdiagnosis. These undesirable
consequences underscore the need to develop reliable methods for genetic screening. Im-
provements must be made in obtaining amniotic fluid and assuring an adequate sample, in
shipment of the fluid, blood, or urine, and in general laboratory procedures. See generaly
Annas & Coyne, supra note 2, at 474-75; Franklin, Medical Mass Screening Programs: .4
Legal .4ppraisal, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 205 (1962); Friedmaf, Legal Implications of Amni-
ocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92, 103-04 (1974); Powledge & Fletcher, supra note 377, at
169-70.
381. See Powledge & Fletcher, supra note 377, at 170.
382. Amniocentesis and ultrasound both are considered to be relatively safe proce-
dures, yet their future effects are unpredictable. Id. See also notes 36-43 supra and accom-
panying text.
383. It would be helpful in future counseling of carriers of genetic disease to study the
1981]
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procedures.
Screening statutes should provide that adequate information
be given to persons screened, both before and after the screen-
ing.384 Before screening, information concerning how the test
works, what it can detect, possible results, and effects of those re-
sults should be discussed.38 5 After the test, the results should be
explained with an exploration of the available options. To pro-
vide such services, a screening statute should include provisions
for adequate training of genetic counselors. Not all genetic coun-
selors must be psychologists or doctors, but guidelines should be
established and obeyed.386 Licensing requirements represent one
method of attempting to assure competent counseling.
To protect the privacy of those individuals screened, statutes
must have provisions for confidentiality of data.387 The release of
genetic information about an individual could be quite harm-
fu; 38 8 therefore, every effort must be made to protect against this
harm. A countervailing consideration is the need to store the
data, thereby enabling followups and statistical analyses to im-
prove genetic screening standards. 389 Another problem concern-
ing confidentiality of screening results arises when a physician or
genetic counselor feels compelled to notify relatives of a person
who has tested positive so that the family can be screened to ascer-
tain if they also carry the same genetic disease. Under a
mandatory genetic screening program, this problem would be
eliminated since everyone would be screened. Specific legislation
psychological reactions, both short term and long term, manifested by carriers when told
they carry a genetic defect and its effects on their futures. These effects may be pronounced
for those parents who undergo amniocentesis and make a decision to abort or have the
child. Increased knowledge of the psychological effects of such decisions will improve ge-
netic counseling.
384. See Powledge & Fletcher, supra note 377, at 170.
385. The early counseling should include the future implications of positive screening
results. Such implications may include choosing whether to have children naturally, decid-
ing whether to abort an affected fetus, and determining whether the expense of rearing an
affected child is within the family budget.
386. For a discussion of the genetic counselor's standard of care, see Capron, supra
note 32, at 620-25, 668-71.
387. See Riskin & Reilly, supra note 275, at 486-506. It is recommended that immedi-
ate legislation be implemented to help data collection agencies in their effort to avoid im-
proper disclosure.
388. Harms include: 1) employers not hiring those individuals with certain genetic de-
fects; 2) increase in insurance rates or cancellation of policies; and 3) personal harms such
as a husband discovering his wife is an XY female or discovering that his wife's child could
not be his own.
389. See Riskin & Reilly, supra note 275, at 483-86.
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could help in this area, as well as in the area of what results
should be disclosed to the person screened.390
Genetic screening statutes should provide for treatment.391
Not all communities and states will have the revenue necessary to
pay for treatment, but within these practical limits, everything
possible should be done to provide treatment for those individuals
who cannot afford it and to allocate funds for research.392
Finally, provisions should be made for educating the public
about genetic disease and its consequences.3 93 With education
comes understanding and less prejudice due to ignorance.3 94 This
education should lessen stigmatization of genetic disease carriers
and should cause people to seek screening to make informed
choices about having a family.
B. Voluntary Versus Mandatory Screening Programs
Legislators must decide whether a screening program should
be mandatory or voluntary. Both the federal and the Maryland
statutes are voluntary. Congress, however, has addressed the pos-
sibility of mandatory genetic screening, 395 and many state screen-
ing statutes are mandatory.396 Since it is the mandatory program
that will cause the most problems constitutionally,397 some states
may prefer a voluntary program. The only way to inform every-
390. Some individuals advocate telling everything to those persons who have been
screened and then counseling them to explain the results and reach a decision. See
Capron, supra note 32, at 645-47. Other individuals think that only some results should be
disclosed. Amniocentesis results, for example, indicate the fetus' sex. There is a concern
that some parents might abort a fetus because it is not the sex they prefer. See Powledge &
Fletcher, supra note 377, at 171-72.
391. "One of the ultimate goals ofprenatal diagnosis should be the treatment and even-
tual cure of disease in the fetus or infant" Powledge & Fletcher, supra note 377, at 171.
392. Few genetic diseases respond to treatment. See note 55 supra and accompanying
text.
393. See P. REILLY, supra note 56, at 147.
394. The Tay-Sachs screening program and the SCA programs, for example, were re-
ceived differently. A founder of Tay-Sachs screening thinks the major difference between
the two programs was that:
Many of the people that were screened for sickle cell didn't really understand
what it was they were being tested for. Whereas . . . most of the peo-
ple--probably all of them]-that came voluntarily and extended an arm to have
a blood sample drawn for a Tay-Sachs [sic] carrier test knew that they weren't
being tested for a disease that they had, knew that this was a test that had to do
with their reproduction, and knew that whatever the test results might be that
there were some options available to them to deal with the problem.
PBS Transcript, supra note 27, at 11.
395. See note 168 supra and accompanying text.
396. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
397. See notes 169-370 supra and accompanying text
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one of his or her potential for having children with a genetic dis-
case, however, is to screen everyone. If such screening were done,
all persons would have the information necessary to make in-
formed decisions in the areas of marriage and reproduction.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has shown the growing need for genetic screen-
ing.398 This need must be met through competent legislation.3 99
The proposals for improved legislation made in this Note are
those proposals necessary to create an adequate genetic screening
statute.4°° It may be, however, that the perceived need for a stat-
ute requiring mandatory screening and costly programs for pro-
viding education, counseling, and treatment concerning genetic
disease has not yet impacted upon legislators, much less the
American population. The proposed screening statute outlined in
this Note, however, could effectively help prevent genetic disease
without advocating that genetic counseling be aimed toward re-
duction of the genetic load or advocating mandatory governmen-
tal involvement in the personal decision of childbearing. 4° 1
CYNTHIA SMITH ADELMAN
398. See notes 16-82 supra and accompanying text.
399. See notes 83-168 supra and accompanying text.
400. See notes 371-97 supra and accompanying text.
401. See note 249 supra and accompanying text.
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